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Abstract 
Many previous studies find that family firms are prevalent among the U.S. firms. In 
particular, more than 35 percent of the S&P 500 firms consist of family firms in which families 
control about 18 percent of their firms’ shares. According to agency theory, the characteristics of 
a firm’s ownership, governance, and control play a critical role in the firm’s risk-taking activities 
and information flow to the market. Our study aims to investigate two controversies in the family 
business literature: whether family firms undertake fewer or more risks than non-family firms do, 
and whether family firms exhibit higher or lower information flow, reflected in their stock price 
informativeness and earnings informativeness, to the market. Using a sample of the S&P 500 
companies as of 2003 for the period 2003-2007, we find that compared with non-family firms, 
the stock prices of family firms have more firm specific information impounded and the 
accounting earnings of family firms are more informative and thereby have more explanatory 
power for stock returns. These results are robust to different model specifications and variable 
proxies. In terms of risk-taking levels in corporate investment, our results indicate that family 
firms, on average, undertake fewer risks than non-family firms do. In particular, we find that 
although G-index is negatively associated with corporate risk-taking in non-family firms as 
previous studies (e.g. John et al., 2008) find for general firms, governance provisions do not have 
any influence on corporate risk-taking decisions in family firms. Numerous additional sensitivity 
tests using different corporate risk-taking proxies confirm the robustness of the findings.  
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1. Introduction  
“Surprise! One-third of the S&P 500 companies have founding families involved in 
management. And those are usually the best performers” (Business Week, 2003, p. 1). 
Conventionally, dispersed ownership, fragmented shareholders, and a separation between 
ownership and control are deemed as the typical features of large U.S. public firms (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). However, during the past decades, especially since 2003, many studies, including 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Anderson and Reeb (2003a; 2003b; 2004), Business Week (2003), 
and Chen et al. (2008) etc.,
1
 have found that firms with concentrated family ownership and 
powerful family control are quite prevalent among U.S. public firms, thereby making family 
firms a promising area of research in the corporate finance literature.  
Family firms are distinct from non-family firms in terms of different perspectives. First, 
there exist families who are in large undiversified equity positions in the firms (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003b). Second, due to family firms’ long-run sustainability across generations, firm 
survival and succession issues constitute two of the major concerns for current family members 
to consider when making corporate decisions, which in turn leads family firms to focus on 
long-term investment and business horizons (as opposed to managerial myopia commonly 
observed in non-family firms) (Stein, 1988; Stein, 1989; James 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a). Third, unlike the free-rider problem typically existing in non-family firms without 
concentrated ownership, families have both the incentives and the ability to oversee and 
discipline managers, and families are normally involved in senior management positions (acting 
as owner-managers) and board seats in their firms, both of which make family firms face less 
severe principal-agent agency problems than non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Ali 
                                                             
1 Different from Anderson and Reeb (2003a; 2003b; 2004) and Business Week (2003) whose identifications of family firms 
are based on S&P 500 firms, Chen et al. (2008) additionally include S&P MidCap 400 firms and S&P SmallCap 600 firms (i.e. 
S&P 1500 index firms) and find that family firms constitute approximately 46% of the S&P 1500 index firms. 
2 
 
et al., 2007). Fourth, other than accomplishing firm-oriented goals (e.g. maximizing shareholder 
wealth), families may have the propensity to pursue family-oriented noneconomic goals (e.g. 
preserving social-emotional wealth) which may only benefit families themselves rather than 
increasing shareholder wealth (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman et al., 
2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
Although empirical studies on the difference in firm performance between family and 
non-family firms have been extensively conducted, little attention has been given to family firms’ 
risk-taking propensity relative to that of non-family firms. According to agency theory, the 
characteristics of a firm’s ownership structure and governance mechanisms play a critical role in 
the firm’s risk-taking activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). As it has generally been accepted that family firms differ from non-family firms in terms 
of organizational and governance structures, the risk-taking levels in these two distinct corporate 
contexts are supposed to be different. However, despite the priori concept that family firms are 
consistently involved in risk-reducing activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b), “whether family 
firms take risks to the same extent as nonfamily firms is controversial” (Naldi et al., 2007, p. 36). 
For instance, theoretically, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that family firms are usually more 
risk averse and thereby undertake less risky investments than non-family firms do, whereas 
Zahra (2005) notes that family ownership and involvement actually promote risk-taking 
activities. Empirically, Anderson and Reeb (2003b), which to the best of our knowledge is the 
only study in the family business literature that empirically investigates family firms’ risk levels 
compared with those of non-family firms, find no significant differences in direct measures of 
equity risk (i.e. total risk, systematic risk, and firm-specific risk) between family and non-family 
firms. However, Anderson and Reeb’s (2003b) findings are contrary to the authors’ prior 
argument and expectation that due to their survival concern and their large undiversified equity 
position, families have substantial incentives to minimize firm risk.  
Like corporate insiders (i.e. controlling shareholders and managers) in any category of firms, 
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families face two aspects of risks: business risk that arises from the fluctuation in a firm’s 
performance (e.g. volatility of corporate earnings), and equity risk that arises from the variation 
in a firm’s stock price. In particular, both of these two types of risks a firm confronts could be 
closely associated with the overall quality of the firm and its corporate governance (Gompers et 
al. 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Zahra 2005; John et al., 2008). In our study, by using volatility 
of corporate earnings to proxy for corporate risk-taking, we empirically examine whether family 
firms undertake fewer or more risks than non-family firms do. With respect to equity risk, we 
focus on the firm-specific portion of it, namely idiosyncratic risk (or idiosyncratic volatility), 
which is generated by firm-specific components such as “the success of new product innovations, 
cost-cutting efforts, a fire at a manufacturing plant, the discovery of an illegal corporate act, a 
management change, and so forth” (Grinblatt and Titman, 2002, p. 176). In the literature, there is 
another school of interpretation about idiosyncratic volatility. Previous studies unanimously 
suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is an ideal measure of stock price informativeness. Therefore, 
by looking into idiosyncratic volatility in family and non-family firms, our study could 
alternatively suggest whether the stock prices of family firms have more or less firm specific 
information impounded than those of non-family firms.  
Regarding information flow for family firms, besides stock price informativeness, we also 
investigate whether family firms have higher or lower earnings informativeness (a different 
aspect of information flow) than non-family firms, on which there is no agreement in the 
literature. Theoretically, there are two competing arguments: the entrenchment argument which 
suggests that families’ significant stock ownership, active involvement and control in board seats, 
and dominant occupation in senior management positions would create incentives for family 
members to manipulate accounting earnings to exploit private benefits; the alignment argument 
which suggests that family firms’ long-run sustainability across generations and families’ 
effective monitoring, reputation concern, and especially stewardship tendency would lead family 
firms to report earnings in good faith (Wang, 2006). Empirically, Wang (2006) and Ali et al. 
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(2007) report that the accounting earnings of family firms are more informative than those of 
non-family firms, whereas Ding et al. (2011) find the opposite result. In our study, we continue to 
empirically investigate this controversy.  
Using a sample of the S&P 500 companies as of 2003 for the period 2003-2007, we find 
that, compared with non-family firms, family firms have higher idiosyncratic risk, or 
alternatively, family firms have higher stock price informativeness. Similarly, consistent with 
Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007), we find that the earnings of family firms are more informative 
than those of non-family firms. With regard to the degree of risk-taking in corporate operations, 
our results indicate that family firms undertake fewer risks than non-family firms do. Particularly, 
we find that governance provisions do not have any influence on corporate risk-taking decisions 
in family firms, whereas non-family firms with fewer (more) antitakeover provisions undertake 
more (fewer) risks, a result that is consistent with John et al.’s (2008) findings.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous relevant 
literature and develops our research questions. Our sample, variable measures, and research 
design are described in Section 3. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 examines the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Definitions of Family Business  
What is the essence (or the unique feature) that characterizes a firm as a family business? 
Conceptually and intuitively, the commonly accepted distinctive feature of a family business is 
family involvement in the firm. Previous studies define family involvement based on a 
combination of ownership, management, governance, and succession (Handler, 1989; Churchill 
and Hatten, 1987). Chua et al. (1999) document that the four components of family involvement 
5 
 
are widely used as the basis for the operational definition for family business.
2
 
By looking into more than 250 articles in the family business literature, Chua et al. (1999) 
summarize a list of 21 definitions based on family involvement, mainly in terms of management 
and ownership.
3
 As Chua et al. (1999) find out, those 21 definitions for family business can be 
generally enumerated as a combination of two factors, ownership and management: (i) family 
owned and family managed; (ii) family owned but not family managed; and (iii) family managed 
but not family owned.  
Many identifications of family firms in the recent and classical family business literature are 
based on family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management).
4
 For instance, 
Business Week (2003) defines family firms as “those in which the founders or their families 
maintain a presence in senior management, on the board, or as significant shareholders” 
(Business Week, 2003, p. 1).
5
 We can notice from this definition that the wording or is used, 
indicating that family firms are identified as long as any one of these three criteria is met. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a; 2003b; 2004) define family firms as “firms where the family 
continues to have an equity ownership stake or board seats” (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, p. 
1312). Obviously, different from Business Week’s (2003) definition, Anderson and Reeb do not 
include family involvement in management as a criterion to define family business. Again, or is 
used to connect the two different criteria, suggesting that either one of them or both is sufficient 
to identify family firms. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) follow two conditions to identify family 
firms: (i) “two or more directors had a family relationship”; and (ii) “family members owned or 
controlled at least 5 percent of the voting stocks” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, p. 230). 
                                                             
2 “An operational definition identifies the observable and measurable characteristics that differentiate the entity, object, or 
phenomenon from others.” (Chua et al., 1999, p. 23) 
3 For more details about the 21 definitions, please refer to Chua et al. (1999) on page 21.  
4 Kelly et al. (2000) and Sundaramurthy and Kreiner (2008) suggest that family involvement, particularly in the forms of 
ownership and management, would facilitate families to control their firms and exert significant influences on their firms’ 
decision making, strategy formulation, and daily operations.  
5 The definition of family firms followed by Business Week (2003) has been widely adopted among empirical research on 
family business (Ali et al., 2007, p. 246, footnote #9).  
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Gomez-Mejia et al.’s (2003) definition is much more restrictive than the former two. First, and is 
used between the two conditions, indicating that both of them should be simultaneously met to 
qualify as family firms. Second, the two conditions are more specific—i.e. 5 percent is set up as 
a minimum requirement for family ownership and at least two directors are stipulated for family 
involvement and control in board seats, whereas the former two definitions introduced do not 
have such detailed quantity requirements.  
 When different definitions are used to identify family firms in different studies, it may be 
difficult to reconcile research results from these studies (Chua et al., 1999). In this case, our 
understanding of family business will be negatively impacted and especially no generalization 
can be established from these studies. In order to enrich and contribute to the literature on family 
business, in our study, we follow Business Week’s (2003) definition, which is the most 
extensively used among empirical research on family business, to identify family firms.      
2.2 Corporate Governance Characteristics in Family Firms 
Generally, dispersed ownership, fragmented shareholders, and a separation between 
ownership and control are deemed as the typical features of large U.S. public firms (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out that large shareholders are 
extensively observed among large public firms. Particularly, family presence, in terms of both 
large equity holding and dominant occupation on board seats, is observed in approximately one 
third of the Fortune 500 firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Other previous researchers also find 
the same phenomenon—family ownership and control are quite prevalent among U.S. firms. For 
instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) document that more than 35 percent of the S&P 500 firms 
consist of family firms in which families control about 18 percent of their firms’ shares. Similarly, 
Business Week (2003) also finds that family presence (founders or their family members serving 
as directors or occupying senior management positions) appears in 177 firms of the S&P 500. 
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However, ironically, both journalistic accounts and previous literature indicate that family 
ownership and control in U.S. public firms are an inefficient and unprofitable organizational 
structure (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). With such prior negative argument about family 
ownership and control, why is this kind of organizational form still quite common among U.S. 
firms? Next, we will examine the potential benefits and costs of family ownership and control 
respectively.  
2.2.1 The Potential Benefits of Family Ownership and Control  
Family ownership, as a special class of concentrated ownership, can provide potential 
benefits in terms of different perspectives. One major advantage generated from family 
ownership is the monitoring effect through which families have both the incentives and the 
ability to oversee and discipline managers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). This advantageous 
attribute of family ownership is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) argument that large 
shareholders have great incentives to minimize agency problems (e.g. managerial expropriation) 
and maximize firm value. Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate that family controlled 
firms bear less costs of monitoring, which makes family controlled firms more efficient than 
firms run by professional managers.   
From the view of investment decisions, due to their long standing presence in the firms, 
families generally have longer investment horizons (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). James (1999) 
suggests that such longer investment horizons in family firms can significantly improve 
investment efficiency. Although generally only diversified shareholders (as opposed to 
concentrated shareholders) potentially make investment decisions based on the market 
rule—maximizing the value of the firm’s residual cash flows, James (1999) indicates that family 
ownership (as a special class of concentrated ownership) prompts family firms to follow the 
market rule to invest—another aspect, other than longer investment horizon, that contributes to 
greater investment efficiency in family firms. Consistent with Chua et al.’s (1999) theoretical 
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definition of family business,
6
 Anderson and Reeb (2003a) demonstrate that the succession issue 
plays an important role in investment decisions in family firms. Specifically, one of the major 
tasks and objectives of current family members is to pass their firms to their next generations, 
leading to firm survival as a main concern for current family members to consider (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003a). With firm survival concerns and their large undiversified equity position, families 
are “potentially long term value maximization advocates” (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, p. 1306).  
As Anderson and Reeb (2003a) suggest, family presence with a long-run horizon in a firm 
can potentially affect the relationship between the firm and external parties, such as suppliers and 
capital providers. Those external parties prefer to do business with relatively fixed governance 
entities such as family firms rather than with other entities in which turn-over is more frequent 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). One example introduced by Anderson et al. (2003) about the 
benefits of families’ long standing presence is that family firms bear lower cost of debt financing 
than non-family firms. In order to preserve such an advantageous relationship with external 
parties, reputation constitutes another concern for family firms, suggesting that families have 
strong incentives to refrain from taking actions that are detrimental to the firm and to the firm’s 
reputation. Furthermore, according to the steward theory proposed by Davis et al. (1997), family 
members deem their firms as assets that are closely tied to themselves, associate their firms’ 
health with their own well-being, and function as stewards of their firms, all of which 
alternatively explain the reputation concern of family firms. In addition, consistent with Davis et 
al.’s (1997) steward theory, Steier (2003) notes that family members, usually as owner-managers, 
function as stewards of their firms’ resources and thereby distribute them on the basis and aim of 
generating value and wealth.   
                                                             
6 “The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the 
business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is 
potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families.” (Chua et al., 1999, p. 25) 
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2.2.2 The Potential Costs of Family Ownership and Control 
Like any class of large shareholders, families have both the incentives and the power to 
expropriate private benefits both from their firms and from minority shareholders (Demsetz, 
1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio et al., 2001). DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2000) document that such private benefits can be collected by families through 
excessive compensation, related-party transactions, and special dividends.  
One major issue arising from family ownership and control is managerial entrenchment. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) find that this issue is widely observed in family firms, leading to poor 
decision making especially under the situation that family firms are owned and managed by 
descendants (Burkart et al., 2003). As Anderson and Reeb (2003a) suggest, families are in a 
uniquely advantageous position to appoint directors and managers, consequently deterring 
bidding by third parties and thus making their firms more insulated from takeovers and from the 
market for corporate control. Managerial entrenchment in family firms can also result in other 
side effects. Schulze et al. (2001) note that incompetent and unqualified family members who 
dominantly occupy senior management positions may stimulate resentment by non-family 
employees and executives, leading to negative impact on those non-family employees’ 
motivation, effort, and productivity (Burkart et al., 1997). In addition, restricting senior 
management positions to incompetent and unqualified family members may place family firms at 
a competitive disadvantage compared with non-family firms.  
Another major cost resulting from family ownership and control is risk aversion and 
avoidance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b). Anderson and Reeb (2003b) suggest that due to their 
survival concern and their large undiversified equity position, families have substantial 
incentives to minimize firm risk. An alternative explanation for family firms’ risk avoidance is, 
once again, related to the succession issue. Burkart et al. (2003) state that “A crucial issue in the 
discussion of family firms from the perspective of corporate governance and finance is 
10 
 
succession” (Burkart et al., 2003, p. 2167). This crucial issue makes passing their firms to their 
next generations a major concern for current family members. According to Anderson and Reeb’s 
(2003b) study, two ways can be used by families to mitigate firm risk: diversification and 
low-default capital forms (e.g. equity financing). Specifically, for diversification, although it is 
an effective strategy for family firms to realize their objective of minimizing firm risk, it can 
cause substantial conflicts of interests with minority shareholders;
7
 for low-default capital forms, 
family firms usually avoid using debt financing, which has relatively high probability of default, 
but instead rely more on equity financing. Both of these can bring substantial costs to diversified 
minority shareholders.
8
  
In summary, families, as a special class of large shareholders, are in a large undiversified 
equity position, have a long standing investment horizon (as opposed to managerial myopia 
commonly observed in non-family firms (Stein, 1988; Stein, 1989)), view survival and the 
succession issue as one of their major concerns, and normally occupy senior management 
positions, all of which place families in a uniquely advantageous position to impose their 
distinctive corporate governance and control on their firms.    
2.3 Control Enhancing Governance Provisions and Family Involvement 
The adoption of control enhancing governance provisions is a critical component of 
corporate governance. As we previously introduced, family firms exhibit unique corporate 
governance characteristics. We thereby expect that family firms would accordingly demonstrate 
their particular propensity to use control enhancing governance provisions idiosyncratically.  
On the one hand, in family firms, sustaining control status and enhancing powerful 
                                                             
7 Allen and Panian (1982) show that families usually have and go after their own concerns and interests, which may conflict 
with those of the firm or other shareholders. Carly Fiorina, who used to be the CEO of Hewlett-Packard from 1999 to 2005, 
indicates that the interests of families, such as stability and capital preservation, may not align with the interests of minority 
shareholders (The Wall Street Journal, 2001).  
8 For diversification, many empirical studies suggest that it can bring negative impact on firm value. For instance, Martin 
and Sayrak (2003) argue that diversified firms do not have sufficient free cash flow allocated for potential investment 
opportunities, leading to investment inefficiency and thereby negatively affecting firm value. 
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influences constitute a major objective for families who act as controlling owners. Burkart et al. 
(2003) argue that in family firms, families would do their best to preserve family control on their 
firms. Likewise, Gedajlovic et al. (2004) suggest that families are usually unwilling to release 
family control on their firms to non-family entities, making families “hang on to the control too 
long from non-controlling shareholders' perspective” (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003, p. 697). In 
order to maintain their power and voice, families tend to use control enhancing governance 
provisions (e.g. unequal voting rights and cumulative voting) which can protect their control 
status by increasing their voting rights relative to their cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2008).
9
 Another driver of families idiosyncratically utilizing control 
enhancing governance provisions arises from families’ preference for pursuing and maximizing 
family-oriented noneconomic goals and benefits, including the establishment of a family dynasty, 
the maintenance of family reputation and prestige, and the build-up of social capital etc., all of 
which in turn enhance families’ desire to sustain family influence and control by using control 
enhancing governance provisions (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et 
al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2012).  
In family firms, controlling family owners usually designate family members to occupy 
senior management positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Morck and Steier, 2005). Even under 
the situation that controlling family owners are not directly involved in management due to their 
preference of solely being investors, they would instead influence management indirectly by 
nominating their favorite non-family managers and affiliated directors who are to represent 
                                                             
9 “Unequal Voting rights limit the voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of others” (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 
150). “Cumulative Voting allows a shareholder to allocate his total votes in any manner desired, where the total number of votes 
is the product of the number of shares owned and the number of directors to be elected”; cumulative voting can facilitate families 
to concentrate their votes to elect their favorite directors (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 147). 
Villalonga and Amit (2008, p. 19) enumerate four examples to illustrate families’ control rights in excess of their cash flow 
rights by using dual class shares: (i) Comcast Corporation of which in 2000, families held only 3.14% of the firm’s shares but 
controlled 85.64% of the votes; (ii) Ford Motor Company of which in 1998, families held only 6% of the firm’s shares but 
controlled 40% of the votes; (iii) Viacom Inc. of which in 2000, families held only 13.3% of the firm’s shares but controlled 
67.55% of the votes; and (iv) Tyson Foods, Inc. of which in 1998, families held only 45.41% of the firm’s shares but controlled 
89.05% of the votes. 
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families to “shape and pursue the vision of the business in a manner that is potentially 
sustainable across generations of the families” (Chua et al., 1999, p. 25), who are to follow 
controlling family owners’ desired ways to run the firms, and who are to facilitate families’ 
pursuing and maximizing noneconomic goals and benefits (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Morck and 
Steier, 2005; Combs, 2008; Jones et al., 2008). Therefore, overall, management in family firms, 
which may consist of family members, non-family members, or both, would facilitate families’ 
realizing family-oriented goals, which in turn enhances controlling family owners’ intention to 
protect managers by using control enhancing governance provisions.  
On the other hand, although maintaining family influence and power may potentially create 
incentives for controlling family owners to protect themselves and managers by utilizing control 
enhancing governance provisions, they may not even need to do so, may not be able to do so, or 
may refrain from doing so for the following reasons: (a) Controlling family owners’ already 
existing powerful control status, which arises from their significant stock ownership or their 
direct or indirect involvement in management, would generate little motivation for them to 
further protect themselves and managers by using control enhancing governance provisions 
(Kelly et al., 2000; Sundaramurthy and Kreiner, 2008); (b) Strong country-level investor 
protection mechanisms, which effectively protect minority shareholders’ rights, would make 
controlling family owners less able (or even unable) to manipulate the adoption or the use of 
control enhancing governance provisions (Peng and Jiang, 2010); (c) The use of control 
enhancing governance provisions (e.g. resisting value-enhancing takeovers to maintain control 
status) can facilitate families’ pursuance of noneconomic goals, which may only benefit families 
themselves but harm firm performance and reduce shareholder wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010). According to the steward theory proposed by Davis et al. (1997), families associate their 
firms’ health and success with their own well-being and thereby function as stewards of their 
firms. Likewise, Zahra (2003) suggests that in family firms, families usually deem firm-oriented 
goals (e.g. maximizing shareholder wealth) as being more important than their own or 
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family-oriented goals. Therefore, from the perspective of families’ stewardship tendency, 
controlling family owners may be refrained from utilizing control enhancing governance 
provisions.  
2.4 Comparison of Risk-taking between Family and Non-family Firms 
According to agency theory, the characteristics of a firm’s ownership, governance, and 
control play a critical role in the firm’s risk-taking activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In particular, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that family firms 
are usually more risk averse and thereby undertake less risky investments than non-family firms 
do. In addition, agency theory also suggests a close association between risk-taking and 
management equity ownership in a firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). 
Specifically, there is a positive relationship between managers’ risk aversion and their equity 
ownership in the firm (Denis et al., 1997). Based on these aspects of agency theory, we expect 
the level of risk avoidance in family firms to be higher than that in non-family firms for the 
following reasons: (a) As we introduced before, family members are generally in a large 
undiversified equity position and dominantly occupy senior management positions in their firms, 
both of which constitute a close tie between their firms’ health or success and their own wealth 
invested in the firms. In other words, a failure in any investment or strategic decision will have 
financial consequences borne by families, leading to “safety” as the number one priority to be 
considered when making such decisions as international development, the introduction of a new 
product to the market, the launch of a cost-efficiency scheme, the enhancement of R&D, and the 
dismissal of an executive etc. (Grinblatt and Titman, 2002).
10
 As Zahra (2005) suggests, the 
risks of failure in such decisions are enormous, even for highly mature firms; (b) Beyond their 
                                                             
10 Grinblatt and Titman (2002) define events such as “the success of new product innovations, cost-cutting efforts, a fire at a 
manufacturing plant, the discovery of an illegal corporate act, a management change, and so forth” as firm-specific components 
and define “the risk of a security that is generated by these firm-specific components” as firm specific risk (Grinblatt and Titman, 
2002, p. 176).  
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concerns about their own wealth, another concern of current family members is how to 
successfully pass their firms to their next generations so that the financial and social well-being 
of future generations will not be harmed and endangered (James, 1999; Schulze et al., 2002; 
Dyer and Whetten, 2006).
11
 Such survival concern will potentially affect family managers’ 
risk-taking propensity. Compared with non-family firms, a family firm’s name (generally 
presented as the family name) and the reputation associated with it are relatively highly valued 
and preserved across generations. Such persistent preservation of reputation will bring many 
advantages to family firms, e.g. a good and long-run relationship with external parties such as 
suppliers and capital providers. Due to both the succession (survival) concern and the reputation 
concern, family firms tend to be more risk averse. 
Although all of the above arguments suggest that family firms tend to undertake fewer risks 
than non-family firms do, there is no consensus among the literature. For instance, Zahra (2005) 
finds some evidence that family ownership and involvement actually prompt risk-taking 
activities, whereas such risk-taking activities decrease with the length of CEO-founder’s tenure. 
The underlying rationale behind Zahra’s (2005) argument can be explained from two 
perspectives: (a) Family ownership—Families, usually as large shareholders of family firms, 
align their interests closely with those of the firms. Such alignment of interests can potentially 
prompt families to actively pursue innovations, growth opportunities, and even radical strategic 
changes. In addition, for their concerns about their own wealth and well-being, families have 
both strong incentives and powerful abilities to undertake risks in such ways that generate share 
value, provide more employment opportunities for their relatives, and make their firms more 
competitive in the market; (b) Family involvement—Both family involvement and control in 
board seats and family involvement in management positions enhance families’ better 
understanding of their firms, including potential investment opportunities and their firms’ 
                                                             
11 Most of the studies on family businesses indicate that rather than simply pursuing a sustainable income stream, the major 
vision for current family members in a family firm is to pass on a legacy to their future generations (Dyer and Whetten, 2006).  
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competitive advantages and disadvantages in the market. Such better understanding facilitates 
families to better evaluate alternative investment options, which in turn prompts families to 
undertake carefully assessed risks, explore investment alternatives, and devise appropriate 
strategies to accomplish them. Another argument about family firms’ tendency to undertake risky 
investments is from the perspective of families’ propensity to pursue and maximize noneconomic 
goals and benefits, including the establishment of a family dynasty, the maintenance of family 
reputation and prestige, and the build-up of social capital etc., all of which in turn enhance 
families’ desire to sustain family influence and control (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2012). The objective 
of families’ pursuit of noneconomic goals is to preserve socio-emotional wealth, or in other 
words, failure in accomplishing such noneconomic goals would result in loss of socio-emotional 
wealth (Chua et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2012). 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) argue that in order to prevent a potential loss of socio-emotional 
wealth, family firms are willing to bear substantial risks to their firm performance. Likewise, 
Chrisman et al. (2003) show that family firms would like to pursue socio-emotional wealth at the 
expense of tremendous performance hazard. Similarly, Berrone et al. (2010) document that 
family firms tend to undertake risky environmental investments that are far beyond regulatory 
standards, in which families undertake only a small portion of the risk but obtain the whole 
family socio-emotional benefits (e.g. elevated positive family image in the community) 
generated throughout those activities. Families’ preference for pursuing and maximizing 
noneconomic goals and benefits arises from families’ bearing only a small fraction of the costs 
involved in their expropriation of private benefits of control. Villalonga and Amit (2009) note 
that in family firms, families’ control rights are usually greater than their cash flow rights, 
making families avoid bearing their fair share of the costs of their activities, which in turn 
increases families’ motivation to expropriate private benefits from non-controlling shareholders 
and thereby intensifies principal-principal agency problems in family firms (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976; Claessens et al., 2002; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006).
12
  
The controversy about risk-taking activities of family firms is also from another perspective 
of agency theory. Agency theory implies that owners and managers have different views about 
firm specific risk. Specifically, shareholders can mitigate firm specific risk in their portfolio by 
diversification and thereby do not have too much concern about firm specific risk, whereas 
managers’ income is contingent on firm specific risk, leading to strong incentives for managers 
to execute income smoothing techniques,
13
 such as diversification and hedging,
14
 to reduce their 
income exposure to firm specific risk (Aron, 1988; Denis et al., 1997). Such divergent views 
about firm specific risk constitute another aspect of conflicts of interests between owners and 
managers. However, families, usually as large shareholders of family firms, have both the 
incentives and the ability to monitor managers, and families normally occupy senior 
management positions (acting as owner-managers), both of which restrain risk-reducing 
activities by managers commonly observed in non-family firms. On the other hand, as we 
introduced before, families are generally in a large undiversified equity position in their firms, 
leading to substantial incentives for family members to actively pursue risk-reducing activities to 
compensate their disadvantageous equity diversification in their portfolio. 
Overall, based on all of the above mixed arguments about risk-taking activities in family 
firms, the question of whether family firms undertake fewer or more risks than non-family firms 
do becomes an empirical issue. Therefore, we put forward our first research question:  
                                                             
12 Maury (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) suggest that in family firms, principal-principal (controlling shareholders versus 
non-controlling shareholders) agency problems are more severe than principal-agent (owners versus managers) agency problems. 
13 There are other incentives for managers to carry out diversification: (a) managing firms with large size makes managers 
famous and dignified (Stulz, 1990); (b) executive compensation for managers usually increases with firm size (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Gabaix and Landier, 2008); (c) the decrease in firm specific risk resulting from diversification makes managers’ 
job secure and thereby increases managerial entrenchment (Amihund and Lev, 1981; Amihund et al., 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989).  
14 For diversification, as we introduced in footnote #8, it can bring negative impact on firm value and thereby on 
shareholders’ wealth. For hedging, Stulz (1990) suggests that hedging itself cannot increase firm value but can be excessively 
used by managers for self-interest purposes to reduce both their employment exposure and the exposure of their executive 
compensation (e.g. managerial stock options) to firm specific risk, leading to negative impact on firm value and thus on 
shareholders’ wealth (Hagelin et al., 2007).  
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Research Question 1 (RQ1): Do family firms undertake fewer risks than non-family firms 
do? 
We have now established that a firm’s corporate governance characteristics have direct 
impact on the firm’s risk-taking activities. Previous studies generally use two variables to 
measure or proxy for the degree of risk-taking in a firm’s operation: (a) firm-level riskiness (i.e. 
volatility of returns-to-capital) measured by using the industry-adjusted volatility of firm-level 
earnings—namely the standard deviation of the deviation of a firm’s EBITDA/Assets from its 
industry average; (b) firm specific risk (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) measured by using idiosyncratic 
volatility. However, in the literature, there is another school of thought and interpretation about 
idiosyncratic volatility. Previous studies unanimously suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is an 
ideal measure of stock price informativeness.
15
 Moreover, previous studies also closely link 
stock price (informativeness) with corporate governance characteristics. For instance, Gompers 
et al. (2003) and Cremers and Nair (2005) suggest that corporate governance has direct impact 
on equity prices, whereas the relationship between corporate governance provisions and 
investors’ expectations or information plays a critical role in equity returns and the variation in 
equity returns (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Gorton et al. (2008) find that corporate governance 
structure is one of the important determinants of the informativeness of stock prices. Therefore, 
overall, we may think of corporate governance characteristics as a channel that links 
idiosyncratic volatility with stock price informativeness. Recall that our RQ1 is to empirically 
examine whether family firms’ unique corporate governance characteristics lead family firms to 
have higher or lower idiosyncratic volatility (i.e. firm specific risk) than non-family firms. Due 
to the interaction among idiosyncratic volatility, stock price informativeness, and corporate 
governance characteristics, in which the last element acts to connect the other two elements, we 
can now alternatively restate RQ1 as follows:  
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Do family firms have less firm specific information 
                                                             
15 Such previous studies include Roll (1988), Morck et al. (2000), Bushman et al. (2002), and Durnev et al. (2003).  
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impounded into stock prices than non-family firms? 
However, before conducting any empirical analysis and testing, we first need to respectively sort 
out the relationship between each pair of elements among idiosyncratic volatility, stock price 
informativeness, and corporate governance characteristics. 
2.5 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Stock Price Informativeness 
In an efficient stock market, stock prices should closely reflect firm fundamentals. 
Information about firm fundamentals can be absorbed into stock prices through two paths: (a) 
Stock prices generally respond to the release of public information, e.g. quarterly earnings; (b) 
The trading by investors with private information (i.e. informed trading) leads to stock price 
variation (Durnev et al., 2003).
16
 Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is 
a proxy for information (especially firm specific information) impounded into stock prices. In 
other words, corporate private information is a major determinant of idiosyncratic volatility. 
Other researchers also find a high connection between idiosyncratic volatility and information 
flow. For instance, in Roll’s (1988) study, the author finds low R2 statistics for common asset 
pricing models and argues that the explanation for this result observed is due to firm specific 
return variation (i.e. idiosyncratic volatility) not associated with public information released but 
associated with private information.
17
 Hence, Roll (1988) suggests that idiosyncratic volatility 
reflects private information, rather than public information, that is impounded into stock prices. 
                                                             
16 Observing low R2 statistics for common asset pricing models, Roll (1988) argues that this path—namely informed 
trading—is particularly critical in the process of incorporation of firm specific information into stock prices.  
17 Roll (1988) documents that stock price variations (i.e. stock returns) are generally attributed by financial economists to 
systematic economic influences, industry influences, and firm specific events. After eliminating the explanatory influences of the 
former two, theoretically, the remaining variation in a firm’s stock price is ascribed to its firm specific information released by 
the financial press or the media (in other words, any information deemed by the media or the financial press as being insignificant 
and thereby negligible would be assumed to have no significant impact on the firm’s stock price). By investigating only time 
intervals in which no firm specific information or news is reported (in this case, theoretically, the variations in stock prices should 
be explained only by systematic economic influences, which should thereby lead to high R2 statistics), however, Roll (1988, p. 
566) finds low R2 statistics for common asset pricing models, which implies “the existence of either private information or else 
occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”. Chen et al. (2007, p. 626) note that the relative significance of these two 
explanations is an empirical issue and that “empirical evidence documented since then [Roll (1988)] provides strong support to 
the hypothesis that price nonsynchronicity reflects more private information than noise”.  
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Durnev et al. (2003) show that more information about future earnings is impounded into stock 
prices with high levels of idiosyncratic volatility. Based on their study, the authors conclude that 
idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with stock price informativeness and that 
idiosyncratic volatility reflects trading on private information (i.e. informed trading).
18
 
According to Durnev et al. (2004), idiosyncratic volatility generally reflects information intensity 
and particularly reveals private information. Durnev et al. (2004) also suggest that the use of firm 
specific return variation (i.e. idiosyncratic volatility) as a proxy for stock price informativeness 
can be justified both conceptually and empirically: (a) Conceptually, it is the trading by investors 
with private information (i.e. informed trading) that results in stock return variation. Lower cost 
of private information can encourage more intensive informed trading, leading to higher firm 
specific variation and a more informative price;
19
 (b) Empirically, as we introduced before, 
many previous studies, such as Roll (1988), Morck et al. (2000), Bushman et al. (2002), and 
Durnev et al. (2003), find a high connection between firm specific variation and stock price 
informativeness. Morck et al. (2000) establish the connection by arguing that in countries with 
well-developed financial systems, traders have more incentive to collect firm specific 
information on individual firms, leading to more firm specific information to be impounded into 
stock prices.
20
 Overall, the underlying rationale behind those studies is that if a firm’s stock 
                                                             
18 Durnev et al. (2003) define stock price informativeness as how much information about future earnings stock prices 
contain (Durnev et al., 2003, p. 833). 
19 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 405) argue “because [collecting private] information is costly, prices cannot perfectly 
reflect the information which is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would receive no compensation.” 
One of the basic comparative statics results obtained by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 399) from their model is that “a decrease 
in the cost of [collecting private] information increases the informativeness of the price system” by encouraging more informed 
trading. Durnev et al. (2004, p. 67) provide further comments on Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) result: “In a market with many 
risky stocks, during any given time interval, [private] information about the fundamental values of some firms might be cheap, 
while [private] information about the fundamental values of others might be dear. Traders, ceteris paribus, obtain more private 
information about the former and less about the latter. Consequently, the stock prices of the former, moving in response to 
informed trading, are both more active and more informative than the stock prices of the latter.” 
20 By regressing individual stock return on market return and then obtaining the average R2 statistics for these regressions in 
different countries, Morck et al. (2000) find low average R2’s in countries with well-developed financial systems (e.g. the United 
States) but high average R2’s in emerging markets (e.g. China). This phenomenon is attributed by Morck et al. (2000) to different 
levels of private property rights and shareholder protection in these sample countries. Specifically, government’s respect of 
private property rights and better shareholder protection in a country (i.e. a country with a low average R2) would encourage 
traders to acquire firm specific information—an argument which is consistent with Roll’s (1988) proposition that low R2 statistics 
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return is highly correlated or synchronized with the market return, then the firm’s stock price is 
less likely to reflect firm specific information (Chen et al., 2007)—a rationale that intuitively 
explains the mechanism of the market model presented in Section 3.1.1.  
2.6 Corporate Governance and Stock Price Informativeness 
Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that corporate governance provisions can potentially 
affect investors’ expectations and information flow. Gompers et al. (2003) use the number of 
antitakeover provisions, which is commonly known as G-index, as a proxy for the quality of 
corporate governance. Fewer antitakeover provisions can result in more private information flow 
and thereby higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). This can be 
explained through several perspectives. From the perspective of agency theory, fewer 
antitakeover provisions in a firm reflect its openness to the market for corporate control, leading 
to strong investor protection.
21
 Clark et al. (2010) suggest that “democratic firms” (firms with 5 
or fewer antitakeover provisions) perform better and have fewer agency problems than “dictator 
firms” (firms with 14 or more antitakeover provisions) and “neutral firms” (firms with 6 to 13 
antitakeover provisions inclusive). Gompers et al. (2003) suggest that firms with more 
antitakeover provisions (i.e. more insulated from takeovers) are less shareholder-friendly. In 
other words, under fewer antitakeover provisions, a firm experiences less expropriation of 
outside investors by insiders which include both large shareholders and managers. This reduced 
expropriation can prompt investors to own and trade the firm’s shares, which can directly 
facilitate more information flow and thereby indirectly facilitate private information flow. From 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
are associated with the trading by investors with private information (i.e. informed trading) (Morck et al., 2000; Durnev et al., 
2004).   
21 Potential takeover threats can function as a type of external governance mechanism, which is generated by the market for 
corporate control, to discipline managers; when an actual takeover happens, it can bring benefits to shareholders by generating 
gains (e.g. substantial positive abnormal returns) and facilitating value-enhancing changes (e.g. replacing ineffective managers, 
whom the current board of directors is unwilling or unable to discipline, and reorganizing control and management of corporate 
recourses) (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1988; Davis, 1991; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Sundaramurthy et al., 1996;  
Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
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the perspective of a trading link hypothesis proposed by Ferreira and Laux (2007), fewer 
antitakeover provisions in a firm, which indicate a greater likelihood of takeover, create more 
incentives for traders to speculate and then collect and trade on private information about the 
firm.
22
 According to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), information generated by 
speculative traders is impounded into market prices throughout the trading process. As Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) suggest, those information collection activities by traders can result in more 
informed trading and more informative pricing, leading to stock prices with more firm specific 
information impounded.  
From the above review of previous relevant literature, one of the key phrases that frequently 
appears is “informed trading”. In other words, informed trading is a major factor responsible for 
firm specific return variation (i.e. idiosyncratic volatility). Therefore, we now investigate the 
relationship among family ownership and control characteristics, informed trading, and stock 
price informativeness—a relationship which can shed more light on our RQ2 developed before.  
2.7 Family Ownership and Control Characteristics, Informed Trading, and 
Stock Price Informativeness 
First of all, let us once again emphasize the prevalence of family firms in the United States.   
Approximately one-third of the S&P 500 firms are founding-family controlled firms (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003a). Compared with other categories of organization structures, family controlled 
firms have their own unique characteristics in terms of corporate governance mechanism, 
                                                             
22 Ferreira and Laux (2007, p. 952) enumerate three previous studies that show or imply evidences that speculators involved 
in takeover collect and trade on private information: “Larcker and Lys (1987) show that speculators in takeover situations are 
better informed about the likelihood of success, which suggests that, indeed, they have collected private information. Moreover, 
Jindra and Walkling (2004) show that offer prices are closer to market prices when there is a large price run-up prior to the 
offer—exactly what should occur if speculators collect and trade on private information in the pre-offer period. Second, fewer 
takeover restrictions could indicate that managers are not expecting a control offer (Comment and Schwert (1995)), implying that 
speculators may profit from correctly anticipating a higher probability of an offer. Third, fewer takeover restrictions could 
indicate that a firm's management or board would have limited bargaining power in the event of a control offer (Comment and 
Schwert (1995)), thereby attracting speculators who would prefer to quickly tender in response to an offer.” 
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including family ownership, family involvement and control in board seats, and family 
involvement in management positions (e.g. CEO). As we presented before, all of these 
characteristics of corporate governance in family controlled firms, combined with investors’ 
expectations or information, have a direct impact on equity returns. Also, as Ferreira and Laux 
(2007) demonstrate, corporate governance mechanism can affect information flow about firms. 
In other words, all of these ownership and control characteristics in a family controlled firm 
potentially affect the firm’s information flow impounded into its stock price. Besides, we 
comment that informed trading is a major factor responsible for firm specific return variation (i.e. 
idiosyncratic volatility). Anderson et al. (2011) find extensively higher volume of informed 
trading in family controlled firms and suggest that family control characteristics, such as family 
involvement and control in board seats, tend to strengthen such informed trading. As we 
previously described, informed trading can result in higher firm specific variation and a more 
informative price, Anderson et al.’s (2011) finding therefore indicates that family control 
characteristics affect stock price informativeness and thereby idiosyncratic volatility.  
In family controlled firms, controlling family members are well-informed shareholders and 
may be the main force of informed trading, because they have long-run knowledge, expertise, 
and privileged information about the firms and thereby have strong incentive to profit from 
informed trading by taking advantage of their information edge (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
Morck et al., 2005; Jaffe, 2006). Anderson et al. (2011) point out that unlike professional 
managers, controlling family members who are not involved in management positions are less 
scrutinized by regulators and thereby face less constraints on informed trading on privileged 
information. Anderson et al. (2011) also posit that family controlled firms can facilitate leakage 
of private information about firms both directly and indirectly: (a) Disharmony or even conflicts 
of interests among family members in a family controlled firm can result in detrimental activities 
by those family members who are not employed by the firm (Schulze et al., 2003). Such 
detrimental activities may include information leakage to outside investors with incentive to 
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engage in informed trading; (b) As Anderson and Reeb (2003a) suggest, managerial 
entrenchment, resulting both from families’ intervention in choosing managers and directors and 
from incompetent and unqualified family members’ occupation in management positions, is one 
of the major potential costs of family ownership. Other employees who are not family members 
may feel resentful of such managerial entrenchment in family controlled firms and thereby 
intentionally divulge information to outside investors with the incentive to engage in informed 
trading.  
However, on the other hand, family shareholders may also tend to restrict active traders or 
other corporate insiders from trading their firms’ shares. Due to their long standing presence in 
the firms, founding families are more concerned about their reputation, because their reputation 
can potentially affect the relationship between their firms and external parties, e.g. suppliers and 
capital providers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). Therefore, in order to preserve their reputation, 
family shareholders may have the incentive to refrain from informed trading on their privileged 
information.  
To sum up, family shareholders may have both the incentive to take advantage of their 
private information and the incentive to restrict informed trading either by themselves or by other 
corporate insiders and outside active traders. Thus, whether family ownership and control 
characteristics facilitate or curb informed trading, and thereby affect stock price informativeness, 
is an empirical issue.    
As Ferreira and Laux (2007) and other previous studies suggest, idiosyncratic volatility is 
an ideal proxy for information flow (especially private information) about firms, therefore we 
can deduce that family ownership and control characteristics are some of the determinants of a 
family firm’s idiosyncratic volatility.   
Therefore, we expect a difference in idiosyncratic volatility, and thereby in information flow 
impounded into stock prices, between family and non-family controlled firms. This expectation 
constitutes one of the central objectives of our study (RQ2). Specifically, by mainly following 
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Ferreira and Laux’s (2007) empirical framework and incorporating a family binary variable into 
it, we examine whether family controlled firms have higher or lower idiosyncratic volatility than 
non-family controlled firms. Since idiosyncratic volatility is an indicator of information flow 
about firms, we can empirically test whether family-controlled firms have more or less firm 
specific information impounded into stock prices than non-family controlled firms.  
Corporate governance mechanisms do not only affect a firm’s stock price informativeness 
(i.e. idiosyncratic volatility) as we previously discussed, but also affect the quality of the firm’s 
financial reporting (e.g. earnings quality or informativeness) (Wang, 2006). Existing literature 
has consistently showed that the quality of a firm’s financial reporting is positively associated 
with the firm’s corporate governance mechanism (Wang, 2006).23 For typical U.S. public firms 
with a separation of ownership and control, in which professional managers rather than diffused 
outside shareholders dominate corporate decision making, professional managers have strong 
incentives to manipulate financial accounting information by distorting the substance or essence 
of underlying economic transactions to expropriate private benefits from both shareholders and 
creditors (Healy and Kaplan, 1985; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Warfield et al., 1995; Leuz, 
et al., 2003). However, if contracting terms are devised by contracting parties (e.g. debt 
contracting terms devised by creditors) to be highly contingent on the quality of financial 
reporting, firms would have strong motivation to deliver high quality financial accounting 
information to get better contracting terms such as a lower cost of capital (Ball et al., 2000; Ball 
et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Wang, 2006). Many previous studies in the accounting 
literature have examined the relation between the quality of financial earnings and different 
characteristics of ownership structure. Warfield et al. (1995) find that earnings quality is 
positively associated with managerial ownership. By investigating the relation between the 
informativeness of accounting earnings and corporate ownership structure in East Asia, Fan and 
                                                             
23 Due to potential endogeneity concern, we do not arbitrarily state whether superior corporate governance mechanisms lead 
to higher quality financial reporting.  
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Wong (2002) show that firms with higher concentrated ownership demonstrate lower earnings 
informativeness.
24
 Francis et al. (2005) report that earnings response coefficient (ERC), which is 
one of the commonly accepted proxies for earnings quality or informativeness in the accounting 
literature, is significantly lower for dual class stocks than for single class stocks, suggesting that 
single class firms demonstrate higher earnings informativeness than dual class firms.  
As our brief summarization (at the end of Section 2.2) of corporate governance 
characteristics in family firms demonstrates, families, as a special class of concentrated 
shareholders, are in a large undiversified equity position, have a long standing investment 
horizon (as opposed to managerial myopia commonly observed in non-family firms (Stein, 1988; 
Stein, 1989)), view survival, succession, and reputation issues as major concerns, and normally 
occupy senior management positions, all of which place families in a uniquely advantageous 
position to impose their distinctive corporate governance and control on their firms. Due to these 
unique ownership and control characteristics of family firms, we expect that earnings quality in 
such a unique ownership and control context would accordingly exhibit distinctive features. 
Therefore, in the following section, we will discuss in detail the relation between family 
ownership and control characteristics and earnings quality.  
2.8 Family Ownership and Control Characteristics and Earnings Quality 
Family firms’ unique ownership and control characteristics have potential impact, both 
positive and negative, on earnings quality. 
2.8.1 The Negative Impact of Family Ownership and Control Characteristics on Earnings 
Quality 
According to traditional agency theory, controlling large shareholders have powerful 
                                                             
24 Fan and Wong’s (2002) study is based on a sample of 977 firms in seven East Asian economies. 
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incentives to expropriate private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, families’ significant stock ownership, active 
involvement and control in board seats, and dominant occupation in senior management 
positions would create incentives for family members to manipulate accounting earnings to 
exploit private benefits. Examples of such expropriation by family members through earnings 
manipulation include hiding the negative consequences of related party transactions and 
entrenching family members in management positions (Ali et al., 2007). 
 On the other hand, concentrated ownership may not only cause agency problems between 
controlling large shareholders and minority shareholders, but also bring benefits, such as 
effective monitoring on management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
25
 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
show that concentrated ownership creates strong incentives for controlling large shareholders to 
minimize agency problems (e.g. managerial expropriation) and maximize firm value, thereby 
aligning the interests of controlling large shareholders closely with those of minority 
shareholders. As we previously discussed in Section 2.2.1, one major advantage generated from 
family ownership, which is a special class of concentrated ownership, is the monitoring effect 
through which families have both the incentives and the ability to oversee and discipline 
managers. In addition to effective monitoring on management, family firms' long term 
investment and business horizon (as opposed to managerial myopia commonly observed in 
non-family firms (Stein, 1988; Stein, 1989)) as well as survival, succession, and reputation 
concern all enhance the alignment of interests between families and other shareholders, thereby 
indicating a superior corporate governance in family firms. However, if users of financial 
accounting information, e.g. contracting parties such as creditors,
26
 perceive ex ante that family 
                                                             
25 Gilson and Gordon (2003) document that despite the potential principle-principle agency problems arising from the 
presence of controlling large shareholders, minority shareholders would still desire the existence of such entities in a firm since 
the benefits generated from the decrease in principle-agent agency problems are usually greater than the costs resulting from the 
expropriation of private benefits of control.  
26 Users of financial statements generally include shareholders, creditors, or other contracting parties who rely on high 
quality financial accounting information to devise contracting terms and monitor managers (Wang, 2006).   
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firms have stronger corporate governance, and thereby accordingly devise their contracting terms 
to be less contingent on the quality of financial statements, family firms would in turn have less 
motivation to deliver high quality financial accounting information. Similar to this argument, 
Bushman et al. (2004) point out that due to the mutually substitutive effects between direct 
monitoring activities and the quality and timeliness of the disclosure of financial accounting 
information, the effective monitoring by family owners on management would potentially reduce 
the demand for (or reliance on) accounting information (for the purpose of monitoring managers) 
from other non-family shareholders, thereby leading to less incentive for family firms to provide 
high quality financial accounting information. Bushman et al.’s (2004) argument is consistent 
with Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) documentation that the quality of financial reporting is 
positively associated with the market demand for quality accounting information.  
2.8.2 The Positive Impact of Family Ownership and Control Characteristics on Earnings 
Quality 
From the perspective of family firms themselves, the superior aspects of corporate 
governance arising from family firms’ unique ownership and control characteristics (as just 
discussed in the above section) would lead family firms to report earnings in good faith, refrain 
from earnings manipulation that is harmful to the family’s reputation and detrimental to the 
firm’s long-run sustainability, and thereby produce high quality earnings (Wang, 2006).27 In 
particular, due to the effective monitoring by families on management, family firms would rely 
less on earnings-based performance measures, but rather rely more on managers’ effort detected 
through direct monitoring, to compensate their managers. This leads to less incentive (arising 
from managerial opportunism) for managers to manipulate earnings (Fields et al., 2001; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Chen, 2006). In addition, due to families’ long-run knowledge, expertise, and 
                                                             
27 Similarly, Klein (2002) suggests that superior corporate governance would reduce managers’ incentives—incentives 
arising from managerial opportunism—to manipulate earnings.  
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privileged information about their firms, it would be much easier for family members to detect 
managers’ earnings manipulation and “thereby keep this activity in check” (Ali et al., 2007, p. 
239). Moreover, the potential earnings management conducted by managers would be further 
restrained if family members act as owner-managers. Lastly, due to their large undiversified 
equity position and their long term investment horizon, families would incur substantial costs 
from litigation and decreased stock prices if they exploit private benefits through earnings 
manipulation and such expropriation is detected by the market; such substantial costs would 
thereby potentially restrain family members’ incentive to manipulate earnings (Ali et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, the inferior aspects of corporate governance resulting from family firms’ 
distinctive ownership structure (as just presented in the above section) could lead family 
members to expropriate private benefits from other shareholders through aggressive earnings 
manipulation. However, if contracting parties perceive ex ante the existence of such potential 
expropriation by families, they would accordingly devise stricter contracting terms and require 
higher quality earnings so that their interests and benefits are better protected. Under this 
circumstance, family members would have strong incentives to report high quality earnings to 
obtain better contracting terms. In addition, because family firms’ long term investment horizon 
would potentially reduce their concern about short-term capital market pressure, family firms 
would have less incentive to meet or beat markets’ expectations of earnings, be less likely to 
manipulate earnings, and thereby provide high quality accounting earnings (Chen et al., 2008).
28
  
Overall, as we discussed, according to the existing theories and arguments about the mixed 
impact (both positive and negative) of family ownership on earnings quality, it is undetermined 
whether family firms on average have higher or lower earnings quality than non-family firms. In 
other words, the relation between family firms’ unique ownership structure and earnings quality 
is an empirical issue. Therefore, we put forward our third research question:  
                                                             
28 Chen et al.’s (2008) argument is to some extent consistent with Stein’s (1989) documentation that managers are generally 
interested in long-term earnings and therefore would not focus on short-term earnings if their firms are not facing capital market 
pressure.  
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Research Question 3 (RQ3): Do family firms have better earnings quality than 
non-family firms? 
3. Data, Measures, and Methodology 
3.1 Corporate Risk-taking Variables or Proxies 
In order to examine the impact of corporate governance characteristics of a family firm on 
the firm’s risk-taking activities, we first introduce the definition and nature of variables or 
proxies that measure the degree of risk-taking in a firm’s operation, i.e. (a) firm specific risk or 
idiosyncratic risk (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙)—namely idiosyncratic volatility; (b) the industry-adjusted volatility 
of firm-level earnings (RISK1)—namely the standard deviation of the deviation of a firm’s 
EBITDA/Assets from its industry average. 
3.1.1 Idiosyncratic Volatility (𝑰𝒅𝒊𝒐𝑽𝒐𝒍)—The Market Model 
The commonly used measure of idiosyncratic volatility in the literature is derived from the 
market model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
In equation (1), 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the excess return for stock 𝑖  at time 𝑡 ; 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the excess 
value-weighted market index return at time 𝑡; 𝛽𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖𝑚
𝜎𝑚
2 , where 𝜎𝑖𝑚 = 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡) and 
𝜎𝑚
2 = 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑅𝑚𝑡); 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the systematic (or market-related) component of 𝑅𝑖𝑡; 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the 
firm-specific component of 𝑅𝑖𝑡 . The key assumption of the market model is that the 
market-related component and the firm-specific component are independent, i.e. 𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑚𝑡,
𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0.  
Based on the market model, the variance of stock 𝑖’s excess return can be decomposed into 
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two components:
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𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑚
2 + 𝜎𝑖𝜖
2  (2) 
In equation (2), 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑅𝑖𝑡); 𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑚
2  measures firm 𝑖’s market risk (or systematic risk); 𝜎𝑖𝜖
2 , 
which is called (absolute) idiosyncratic volatility, measures firm 𝑖’s firm specific risk (or 
idiosyncratic risk). After substituting 𝛽𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖𝑚
𝜎𝑚
2  into equation (2) and rearranging the equation, 
we get the definition of idiosyncratic volatility:
30
  
𝜎𝑖𝜖
2 = 𝜎𝑖
2 −
𝜎𝑖𝑚
2
𝜎𝑚2
 (3) 
Ferreira and Laux (2007) introduce in their study the concept of relative idiosyncratic 
volatility—defined as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility, 
𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , at time 𝑡. This 
measure is exactly 1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
2  of equation (1).
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 By following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we use in 
our study the logistic transformation of 1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
2  due to the undesirable bounded property of 𝑅2 
(0 ≤ 𝑅2 ≤ 1) and thus 1 − 𝑅2 (0 ≤ 1 − 𝑅2 ≤ 1). Specifically, the measure of idiosyncratic 
volatility used in our study is expressed as follows:  
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 [
(
𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 )
(
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 −𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 )
]= 𝑙𝑛 (
1−𝑅𝑖𝑡
2
𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 −𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 ) = 𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 ) − 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 )    (4) 
In equation (4), we use a logistic transformed measure of idiosyncratic volatility (𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 ) relative to 
market volatility (𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 ). In addition, to be consistent with Durnev et al. (2004) and Ferreira 
and Laux (2007), we scale both idiosyncratic volatility and market volatility by total volatility 
(𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) to mitigate industry effects.
32
   
                                                             
29 For the mathematical derivation of equation (2), please refer to Elton et al. (2007) from p.134 to p.135.  
30 The exact name for 𝜎𝑖𝜖
2  is absolute idiosyncratic volatility.  
31 𝑅2 =
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
=
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝐸𝑆𝑆+𝑅𝑆𝑆
, where “ESS” represents explained sum of squares, “RSS” represents residual sum of squares, and 
“TSS” (TSS=ESS+RSS) represents total sum of squares, thus 1 − 𝑅2 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
 (i). 𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇
, where 𝑇  is the number of 
observations, thus 𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2  (ii). 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =
𝑇𝑆𝑆
𝑇
, thus 𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  (iii). Substituting (ii) and (iii) into (i), 1 − 𝑅2 =
𝑇𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝑇𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =
𝜎𝑖𝜖,𝑡
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . 
32 According to Durnev et al. (2004) and Ferreira and Laux (2007), some firms in certain industries are more likely to be 
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3.1.2 Idiosyncratic Volatility (𝑰𝒅𝒊𝒐𝑽𝒐𝒍)—The Industry Index Model (The Two-Factor 
Model) 
The underlying rationale behind the market model is that stock returns are systematically 
correlated only because of their common co-movement with the market. However, other factors 
beyond the market, such as industry effects, can explain a large proportion of stock return 
variation.
33
 Thus, in addition to the market model, following Durnev et al. (2004), we 
alternatively construct idiosyncratic volatility by using the industry index model (the two-factor 
model) as follows:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑚𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
In equation (5), 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the excess return of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the excess 
value-weighted market index return at time 𝑡; 𝑅𝑗,𝑡  is the excess value-weighted return of 
industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡; 𝛼𝑖,0  is the constant; 𝛽𝑖,𝑚  and 𝛽𝑖,𝑗  are coefficients on 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  and 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 
respectively; 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term or the firm-specific component of 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡.  
Based on the industry index model, stock return variation (𝜎𝑖
2) can also be decomposed into 
two components: firm-specific variation (𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2 ) and systematic variation (𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2 ),
34
 where the 
former one is defined as (absolute) idiosyncratic volatility and the latter one is the combination 
of market-related variation and industry-related variation. Consistent with Durnev et al. (2004), 
Ferreira and Laux (2007), and the measure of idiosyncratic volatility (equation (4)) derived from 
the market model, we construct the logarithmic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility, 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖, which is used in our study, as follows:
35
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
affected by economic turbulences and thereby firm specific events (or firm specific information) associated with those 
turbulences would be accordingly more intensive in such firms, thus in both of these two studies, (absolute) idiosyncratic 
volatility is scaled by total volatility to eliminate such industry effects.  
33 Roll (1988, p. 541) documents that stock price variations (i.e. stock returns) are mainly attributed by financial economists 
to “(1) unpredictable movements in pervasive economic factors, (2) unpredictable changes in the firm’s market environment, i.e., 
industry information, and (3) unpredictable events specific to the firm itself. ” 
34 For both convenience and simplicity of expression, we denote systematic variation as 𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2 . 
35 𝑅2 =
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
=
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝐸𝑆𝑆+𝑅𝑆𝑆
, where “ESS” represents explained sum of squares, “RSS” represents residual sum of squares, and 
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𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛
[
 
 
 
 (
𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2 )
(
𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2 )]
 
 
 
 
= 𝑙𝑛 (
1 − 𝑅𝑖
2
𝑅𝑖
2 ) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2 ) = 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2 ) − 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2 ) (6) 
Basically, a higher value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 would imply a higher proportion of firm-specific 
variation (𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2 ) relative to the combination of market-related variation and industry-related 
variation (𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2 ) in accounting for the stock price movements of firm 𝑖. 
3.1.3 The Industry-adjusted Volatility of Firm-level Earnings (RISK1) 
Risk is the volatility or uncertainty embedded in outcomes generated from an activity or 
activities. From the perspective of corporate risk-taking, the more risky investment projects a 
firm undertakes and the more risky operations it is involved in, the more volatile will be its 
earnings (EBITDA) or its returns to capital (ROA). Enlightened by John et al. (2008) and 
Acharya et al. (2011), we devise an alternative proxy, other than idiosyncratic volatility, for the 
degree of risk-taking in a firm’s operation—namely the industry-adjusted volatility of firm-level 
earnings (RISK1) which is defined as the standard deviation of the deviation of a firm’s 
EBITDA/Assets (i.e. return on assets or ROA) from its industry average:
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𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1 = √
1
𝑇 − 1
∑(𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 −
1
𝑇
∑𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(𝑇 = 12; 𝑇 = 20) (7) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
“TSS” (TSS=ESS+RSS) represents total sum of squares, thus 1 − 𝑅2 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
 (i). 𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇
, where 𝑇  is the number of 
observations, thus 𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2  (ii). 𝜎𝑖
2 =
𝑇𝑆𝑆
𝑇
, thus 𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝜎𝑖
2 (iii). Substituting (ii) and (iii) into (i), 1 − 𝑅2 =
𝑇𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝑇𝜎𝑖
2 =
𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2  
(iv). After rearranging (iv), 𝑅2 = 1 −
𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2 =
𝜎𝑖
2−𝜎𝜖,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2 =
𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
2
𝜎𝑖
2 . 
36 John et al. (2008) use all available annual EBITDA/Assets of a firm over the 1992 to 2002 sample period as long as the 
firm has earnings and total assets available for at least 5 years over that period. In our study, different from John et al. (2008), we 
construct a firm’s RISK1 measure for a certain year by using quarterly data. Specifically, in order to be thorough and also for the 
purpose of robustness check, we consider two different scenarios in our study: (1) For firms with earnings and total assets 
available for at least 12 quarters, we only use the most recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12); (2) For firms with earnings and total 
assets available for at least 20 quarters, we only use the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20). 
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in which 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
−
1
𝑁𝑗,𝑡
∑
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑘,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝑗,𝑡
𝑘=1
 (8) 
In equation (8), 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 denotes the number of firms within industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡; 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
represents the operating income before depreciation of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡; 𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
indexes the total assets of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡. The 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1 measure in equation (7) 
is computed as follows: taking the scenario of 𝑇 = 20 as an example, for a firm that has 
earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters over our sample period 
(2003—2007),37 by only using the most recent 20 quarters of data, we first calculate the 
deviation of this firm’s EBITDA/Assets from its industry average for the corresponding quarter 
and then compute the standard deviation of these 20 deviations for this firm.  
3.2 Sample and Data 
3.2.1 Sample Description  
Business Week (2003) finds that family presence (in most cases, founders or their family 
members serving as board directors or occupying senior management positions) appear in 177 
firms of the S&P 500. The criteria adopted by Business Week (2003) to identify family firms 
include families’ occupation in senior management positions, families’ involvement in board 
seats, or families’ significant stock ownership. These criteria have been widely accepted and used 
among previous empirical studies on family business (Ali et al., 2007).
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 Therefore, in order to 
                                                             
37 John et al. (2008) require at least 5 years of data, within their sample period (1992 to 2002), to compute the RISK1 
measure. In other words, the maximum possible sample period of the RISK1 measure in John et al. (2008) is from 1996 to 2002. 
In our study, in order to match the maximum possible sample period of the RISK1 measure with those of other variables, unlike 
John et al. (2008), we extend the sample period of EBITDA and total assets back to 1999 for the scenarios of 𝑇 = 20, and back 
to 2001 for the scenarios of 𝑇 = 12. By doing so, we have enough quarters of data to compute the RISK1 measure as of years 
between 2003 and 2006 inclusive for the scenario of 𝑇 = 20, and as of 2003 and 2004 for the scenario of 𝑇 = 12.  
38 Ali et al. (2007) enumerate some merits of following Business Week’s (2003) classification—“First, it is free of any 
subjective assessment of family influence, thus making the results more reliable. Second, to the extent a firm classified as family 
firm has only a weak family influence, it would introduce a conservative bias in our results.” (Ali et al., 2007, p. 246) 
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better reconcile and compare our results with those of previous studies, we decide to follow 
Business Week’s (2003) classification of family firms. Specifically, due to family firms’ typical 
long-term business horizon, we first assume the identity of a family firm is relatively stable or 
fixed over time, and then apply those 177 family firms in the S&P 500 as of July 2003 for 5 
years until 2007.
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3.2.2 Data Description  
3.2.2.1 Dependent Variables  
The main dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ2 is 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 , logarithmic transformed 
relative idiosyncratic volatility, which is defined in equations (4) and (6). In addition to 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡, an alternative dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ2, 𝜎𝑖𝜖
2  or absolute idiosyncratic 
volatility which is defined in equation (3), is used for the purpose of robustness check. Moreover, 
for RQ1, we additionally take the RISK1 measure (defined in equation (7)) as the dependent 
variable to capture the degree of risk-taking in a firm’s operation.  
Our dependent variable for RQ3, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡, is defined as 12-month cumulative raw return 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡.  
3.2.2.2 𝑰𝒅𝒊𝒐𝑽𝒐𝒍⁡(𝑹𝟐) 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is constructed by either using daily returns or using weekly returns.  
(1) Using Daily Returns 
Using all the daily returns in a certain year, we first obtain 𝑅2 by running either the market 
model (equation (1)) or the industry index model (equation (5)). We then compute 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 =
𝑙𝑛 (
1−𝑅2
𝑅2
), i.e. by following equation (4) or (6). However, the major potential issue involved in 
using daily returns is the problem of serial autocorrelation. Therefore, we alternatively construct 
                                                             
39 For RQ1 and RQ2, G-index is one of the main independent variables; for RQ3, we control for the firm-level riskiness 
(RISK1) but use the fitted value of RISK1 (due to the endogeneity concern) obtained from RQ1 with RISK1 as the dependent 
variable. Since G-index is only available until 2007, the sample periods for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 are all from 2003 to 2007.  
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𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 by using weekly returns.  
(2) Using Weekly Return 
In order to overcome the day-of-the-week effect (or the weekend effect), by following Lo 
and MacKinlay (1988), we define a week as being from Thursday to the following Wednesday 
rather than being from Monday to Friday (i.e. the calendar week). Therefore, the weekly return in 
our study is computed as follows:
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(1 + 𝑅𝑇ℎ𝑢) × (1 + 𝑅𝐹𝑟𝑖) × (1 + 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛) × (1 + 𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑒) × (1 + 𝑅𝑊𝑒𝑑) = 1 + 𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 (9) 
where 𝑅𝑇ℎ𝑢, 𝑅𝐹𝑟𝑖, 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑛, 𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑒, and 𝑅𝑊𝑒𝑑 respectively represent daily returns from Thursday 
to the following Wednesday correspondingly, where daily returns are computed as closing price 
changes plus dividends; 𝑅𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 denotes the weekly return for the week from Thursday to the 
following Wednesday. We then use all the weekly returns in a certain year to run the market 
model or the industry index model and thereby obtain 𝑅2. Finally, we calculate 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 =
𝑙𝑛 (
1−𝑅2
𝑅2
). 
3.2.2.3 Independent Variables  
(1) The G-index (GOV) 
A major independent variable in our study is the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) governance index (i.e. G-index) constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). The G-index is 
constructed based on the IRRC corporate governance provisions (28 provisions in total) such that 
1 point is assigned to a firm for each provision adopted by this firm—a provision that reduces 
shareholder rights and increases managerial power—and then all the points this firm “earns” are 
summed up to a single number which is the G-index for this firm (Gompers et al., 2003). 26 out 
                                                             
40 The term “the weekly return” here broadly refers to all kinds of returns involved in computing 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 (𝑅2), including 
weekly risk-free return (wRf), weekly stock return (wRi), weekly industry return (wRj), and weekly market index return (wRm). 
Specifically, we first compute wRf, wRi, wRj, and wRm respectively by using equation (9); we then construct excess weekly stock 
return (ewRi), excess weekly industry return (ewRj), and excess weekly market index return (ewRm) as being equal to wRi - wRf, 
wRj - wRf, and wRm - wRf respectively; finally we apply ewRi, ewRj, and ewRm to either the market model or the industry index 
model to obtain 𝑅2 and thereby 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙.  
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of the total 28 provisions have the similar effects—namely restricting shareholder rights and 
enhancing managerial power; however, there are two exceptional provisions, i.e. Secret Ballots 
and Cumulative Voting, which are to the advantage of shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003). 
Therefore, for each of these two exceptional provisions, 1 point is assigned to a firm if this firm 
does NOT adopt it. In addition, 24 out of the total 28 provisions are unique, or in other words, 
there are 4 pairs of overlapped provisions in which the 2 provisions in each pair have similar 
effects; under this circumstance, only 1 point rather than 2 points is assigned to a firm no matter 
whether this firm adopts either one or both of the 2 overlapped provisions in a pair (Gompers et 
al., 2003). Therefore, theoretically, the G-index can only be an integral number between 0 and 24 
inclusive.   
The G-index is generally used as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. A 
firm with a higher G-index would indicate that this firm is more insulated from takeover and 
therefore replacing managers in this firm is more difficult and that managerial power in this firm 
is stronger than shareholder rights, both of which suggest that this firm has a weaker corporate 
governance and is less shareholder friendly (Gompers et al., 2003; Ferreira and Laux, 2007).  
Because the IRRC only publishes the list of corporate governance provisions for each firm 
in Corporate Takeover Defenses every two or three years (Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006), the G-index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) is accordingly only 
available for these corresponding years (Gompers et al., 2003). Therefore, consistent with 
Gompers et al. (2003), we assume the G-index for each firm is fixed from the last IRRC 
publishing year until the next IRRC publishing year. For example, the G-index for a firm in 2003, 
2005, and 2007 is equal to the G-index for this firm in 2002, 2004, and 2006 respectively.  
(2) The Binary Indicator Variable for Family Firms (FamFirm) 
Generally, in previous studies related to ownership structure, the fractional shareholdings of 
target entities in a firm (e.g. institutional shareholders, large shareholders, and multiple large 
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shareholders) are widely used as a measure of control for different ownership levels and thereby 
for different levels of those entities’ influences on the firm (also different levels of those entities’ 
interests in the firm), with a higher percentage of shareholdings indicating greater influences on 
the firm. However, this method may not ideally apply to capture or control for the 
influences—influences in terms of voting and controlling power—that families exert on their 
firms. Both Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Wang (2006) suggest that because families’ control 
rights and thereby influences are usually much greater and more extensive than their equity 
ownership levels would indicate, the binary variable of family ownership is more appropriate 
than the variable which is based on families’ percentage equity holdings.41 In addition, under the 
regulation of the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934, it is compulsory only for executives, 
board directors, and owners with at least 5 percent equity ownership to report their shareholdings 
in the proxy statement. Therefore, using the fractional shareholdings of family members reported 
under the SEA requirements may potentially underestimate the measurement of family 
ownership. For example, if a family member who is neither an executive nor a board director 
owns only 4.99 percent of the firm’s shares, then under the SEA regulation, he or she is not 
required to report such 4.99 percent holdings in the proxy statement. Under this circumstance, 
we cannot include this 4.99 percent into the computation of fractional shareholdings of family 
members, thereby underestimating the measurement of family ownership. In order to overcome 
and avoid such uncertainty, we use a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a 
family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise—namely, we create a 
dummy variable that is equal to one when families either occupy senior management positions or 
board seats or hold significant shares of the firm.  
                                                             
41 Anderson and Reeb (2003a, p. 1308) present an example to illustrate that family members’ equity ownership levels may 
not always accurately reflect families’ control rights and thereby influences on their firms: appearing as if they were dominant 
large shareholders, the Ablon family controls the Ogden Corporation by owning only 2 percent of the company’s shares, whereas 
the same family owns 24 percent of Nordstrom’s shares to control the company.  
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(3) Control Variables 
For RQ1 and RQ2 with 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 as the dependent variable, we control for such factors, 
which are generally known and accepted by previous studies to explain the variation of 
idiosyncratic volatility, as profitability (return-on-equity), profitability volatility (volatility of 
return-on-equity), leverage, market-to-book ratio, market capitalization, dividend dummy, firm 
age, diversification dummy, and earnings smoothing. These control variables are described in 
detail in Appendix A: Definition of Control Variables for Regression Analysis on the Comparison 
in Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family and Non-family Firms. 
For RQ1 with RISK1 as the dependent variable, we control for initial firm size, initial book 
leverage, initial sales growth, and initial corporate earnings. These variables of firm-level 
characteristics are constructed as of 2003 which is the beginning year of our sample period 
(2003-2007). Besides the four typical firm-level attributes, we further control for earnings 
smoothing incentives. Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that in order to exploit and expropriate private 
benefits of control, corporate insiders (i.e. controlling shareholders and managers) have strong 
incentives to manage or manipulate corporate earnings to prevent their expropriation activities 
and bad firm performance from being detected by outsiders. Since the essence of the RISK1 
measure is the volatility of corporate earnings, we consider earnings smoothing incentives as 
another factor, other than those fundamental firm-level characteristics, that may potentially affect 
the RISK1 measure. By following Leuz et al. (2003), we proxy earnings smoothing incentives as 
the ratio (ES1) of the standard deviation of operating income to the standard deviation of 
operating cash flow (operating income minus accruals), in which both the numerator and the 
denominator are scaled by lagged total assets. The underlying rationale behind the ES1 measure 
as a proxy for earnings smoothing incentives is that since manipulating accruals is the major way 
used by corporate insiders to smooth reported earnings, the lower the standard deviation of 
corporate earnings including accruals relative to the standard deviation of corporate earnings 
excluding accruals, the higher is the level of earnings smoothing—namely a lower value of ES1 
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would indicate a higher level of earnings smoothing. For convenience of expression, by 
following John et al. (2008), we convert ES1 into 1 - ES1 and then rename the result as ES2 (i.e. 
ES2 = 1 - ES1). After doing so, a higher value of ES2 (i.e. a lower value of ES1) would indicate a 
higher level of earnings smoothing. Detailed information about all of these control variables is 
presented in Appendix B: Definition of Control Variables for Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family and Non-family Firms. 
For RQ3, by following previous literature on earnings informativeness, such as Warfield et al. 
(1995), Fan and Wong (2002), Francis et al. (2005), and Wang (2006), we incorporate into our 
model several interaction terms between net income and varieties of firm-level characteristics 
such as firm size, firm leverage, firm age, return on assets, and market-to-book ratio etc.. 
Information about these variables is demonstrated in Appendix C: Definition of Control 
Variables for Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Empirical Model for the Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family and 
Non-family Firms 
The main empirical framework for RQ1 and RQ2 in our study follows Ferreira and Laux’s 
(2007, p. 962) regression equation and incorporates a family binary variable into it: 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐4𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑐5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐6𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐8𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑐10𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐11𝐸𝑆2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐12𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 
(10) 
 
Where 𝑖 is a firm index; 𝑡 indexes years; 𝐺𝑂𝑉 is the IRRC governance index constructed by 
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Gompers et al. (2003);
42
 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a 
family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; Control variables 
included in equation (10) are profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐸), profitability volatility (𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸), leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), 
market to book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), market capitalization (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), dividend dummy (𝐷𝐷), firm age 
( 𝐴𝐺𝐸 ), diversification dummy ( 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅 ), earnings smoothing (𝐸𝑆2) , and systematic 
risk⁡(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘).  
3.3.2 Empirical Model for the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family and 
Non-family Firms 
John et al. (2008) argue that stronger firm-level shareholder protection (lower G-index) is 
associated with a higher level of risk-taking in corporate investment. The underlying rationale 
behind the argument is that in firms with better corporate governance (i.e. firms being more 
shareholder friendly and with more effective monitoring), insiders are less likely to (or less able 
to) expropriate corporate resources for the purpose of exploiting private benefits and thereby are 
less inclined to preserve private benefits by being conservative about corporate risk-taking 
decisions (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; John et al., 2008). Other arguments, mainly from the 
perspective of managers’ “safety” concerns, about the positive relationship between firm-level 
shareholder protection and corporate risk-taking exist in the literature. In order to minimize the 
risk of losing their jobs, managers tend to be conservative on corporate investment decisions 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa, 1986; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). 
However, in firms with strong shareholder protection, effective monitoring would weaken 
managers’ risk-averse behaviour, which can bring about a positive relationship between 
shareholder protection and corporate risk-taking.  
 
                                                             
42 The IRRC governance index data constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) are available from Professor Andrew Metrick’s 
website: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐸𝑆2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(11) 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1𝑖,𝑡 =⁡𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐸𝑆2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
(12) 
  
Following John et al. (2008), in equation (11) and (12),
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 we regress volatility of corporate 
earnings (RISK1) on the variable (GOV) that reflects firm-level shareholder protection or 
shareholder friendliness and control for other fundamental firm-level characteristics such as 
initial firm size, initial book leverage, initial sales growth, initial corporate earnings, and 
earnings smoothing. Following John et al. (2008), all of these control variables, except earnings 
smoothing (ES2), are constructed as of 2003 which is the beginning year of our sample period 
(2003-2007). For earnings smoothing (ES2), we construct the variable for every year within our 
sample period. Similar to the model with 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 as the dependent variable, we incorporate the 
family dummy variable to test whether family firms undertake more or fewer risks than 
non-family firms do. In addition, by including an interaction term between G-index and the 
family dummy variable (see equation (12)), we further investigate the impact of family 
ownership and control on G-index and thereby the combined impact of family ownership and 
control and G-index on firm-level riskiness. Many agency-theoretic models suggest that stronger 
investor protection (lower G-index) is associated with higher firm-level riskiness (John et al., 
2008).
44
 Now the question is: what if the factor of family presence is incorporated? In other 
                                                             
43 In both equation (11) and (12), 𝑖 and 𝑡 index firms and years respectively; 𝐺𝑂𝑉 and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 are defined the same 
as those in equation (10).  
44 By conducting both a cross-country study (39 countries) and a single country study (the United States), John et al. (2008) 
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words, would family ownership and control intensify or weaken the effect of G-index on 
corporate risk-taking decisions? As we previously discussed in Section 2.3, due to their 
distinctive corporate governance characteristics, family firms would accordingly demonstrate 
their particularistic propensity to use governance provisions idiosyncratically. Therefore, 
governance provisions (or G-index) are expected to interact with family involvement to affect the 
risk-taking levels in corporate investment. 
3.3.3 Empirical Model for the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family 
and Non-family Firms 
In the existing accounting literature, there are three widely accepted proxies for earnings 
quality: abnormal accruals, persistence of transitory loss components in earnings, and earnings 
informativeness (Wang, 2006). As one of the major research components in our study is related 
to information flow in family businesses, we use earnings informativeness as a proxy for 
earnings quality to examine the impact of family firms’ unique ownership and control 
characteristics on earnings quality. Earnings informativeness is measured as the coefficient on 
earnings by regressing returns on earnings—namely the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
(Teoh and Wong, 1993; Francis et al., 2005). Many previous studies, e.g. Warfield et al. (1995), 
Fan and Wong (2002), and Francis et al. (2005), have used ERC to measure earnings quality. In 
theory, higher earnings informativeness (i.e. higher ERC) indicates better earnings quality (Wang, 
2006).  
The main empirical framework for RQ3 in our study follows Wang’s (2006, p. 631) 
regression equation. However, different from Wang (2006) and other previous studies on 
earnings informativeness, we additionally control for the degree of risk-taking in a firm’s 
operations (RISK1). As we introduced before, the essence of the RISK1 measure is the volatility 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
empirically examine the relationship between shareholder protection and firm-level riskiness and find in both studies a positive 
relationship between these two—namely “stronger shareholder protection is associated with higher firm-level riskiness” (John et 
al., 2008, p. 1681). 
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of corporate earnings. Therefore, by incorporating the interaction term between earnings and the 
RISK1 measure, we can examine whether the fluctuation of corporate earnings (i.e. RISK1), 
being either higher or lower, would prompt firms to manipulate earnings or to report earnings in 
good faith. However, as a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and the degree of risk-taking in its operation 
(RISK1) could be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (GOV), we control for 
RISK1 by using the fitted value of RISK1 obtained from equation (11). Instead of controlling for 
firm operating risk (RISK1), we alternatively control for firm idiosyncratic risk (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙), by 
which we can examine whether earnings are more informative for firms with higher stock price 
informativeness (i.e. higher idiosyncratic risk). Since a firm’s idiosyncratic risk (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) 
could also be impacted by its firm-level shareholder protection and other factors, we control for 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 by using the fitted value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 obtained from equation (10). 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
+ 𝛽9𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
(13) 
 
Where 𝑡 indexes years; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a 
family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise;
45
 Other variables 
involved in equation (13) include 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡, 12-month cumulative raw return ending three months 
after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; ⁡𝑁𝐼𝑡, the change in net income from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡, scaled 
by the market value of equity at the end of 𝑡 − 1; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡, the natural logarithm of market value 
of equity at 𝑡; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡, firm leverage at 𝑡, measured by long-term debt divided by total assets; 
𝑀𝐵𝑡, market-to-book ratio at 𝑡; 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡, the natural logarithm of firm age in years at 𝑡; 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡, 
                                                             
45 Wang (2006) suggests that because families’ control rights and thereby influences are usually much greater and more 
extensive than their equity ownership levels would indicate, the binary variable of family ownership is more appropriate than the 
variable which is based on families’ percentage equity holdings.     
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one if net income is negative, and zero otherwise; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡, return on assets at 𝑡; 𝜖𝑡, error term.  
A significantly negative (positive) estimated value for 𝛽2, the coefficient on the interaction 
term 𝑁𝐼𝑡 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡, would indicate that family firms’ earnings are less (more) informative 
than non-family firms’ earnings—or alternatively speaking, family firms have worse (better) 
earnings quality than non-family firms. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Statistics 
4.1.1 Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Idiosyncratic 
Volatility between Family and Non-family Firms
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Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the volatility variables, 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 and 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, over our sample period (2003-2007). We construct each of these volatility variables for 
each sample year 𝑡, generating 2,327 firm-year observations. We can deduce from the summary 
statistics for 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 that (absolute) idiosyncratic volatility, on average, accounts for 76.04% of 
total individual stock volatility.
47
 Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables, including the G-index, which has 2,363 firm-year observations and has a 
median of 10 and a standard deviation of 2.42. The firms in the entire sample are on average 28 
years old, indicating that they are quite mature firms rather than new ventures that just finished 
the initial public offering (IPO) process.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                             
46 Following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we winsorize extreme observations of the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to avoid spurious inferences generated by the undue influence of outliers. 
47 As we previously defined and derived (see equation (4) and (6) and footnote #31), 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 = ln (
1−𝑅2
𝑅2
) and 
σiϵ,t
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 1 −
𝑅2. After rearranging the first equation, we get 𝑅2 =
1
1+𝑒𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙
 (i). We then substitute (i) into the second equation and get 
σiϵ,t
2
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =
𝑒𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙
1+𝑒𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙
. 
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Table 2 reports univariate statistics, including difference-in-means tests, for all the variables 
between family and non-family firms. All of the volatility variables for family firms are, on 
average, higher than those for non-family firms. Regarding leverage, we find that family firms 
use less debt in their capital structure (0.1697) than non-family firms (0.2033), which is 
consistent with Anderson and Reeb’s (2003b) argument that in order to mitigate firm risk, family 
firms tend to avoid using debt financing, which has high default risk, but instead rely more on 
equity financing. The significantly higher market-to-book ratio for family firms indicates that the 
market considers family firms as being more profitable, a result which is in agreement with 
Anderson and Reeb’s (2003a) finding. With respect to firm size, although family firms appear to 
be small relative to non-family firms, they are still of large size with a mean market 
capitalization of $10.89 billion compared with $11.48 billion for non-family firms. In addition, 
family firms demonstrate long-term business horizon, with an average firm age of 24 years 
relative to 30 years for non-family firms. Finally, the univariate analysis shows that family firms, 
on average, are less diversified than non-family firms, which is consistent with Anderson and 
Reeb’s (2003b) finding.  
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.1.2 Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate 
Risk-taking between Family and Non-family firms
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Following John et al. (2008), we construct all the control variables, except earnings 
smoothing (ES2), as of the beginning year (i.e. 2003) of our sample period (2003-2007). For 
earnings smoothing (ES2), we construct the variable for every year within our sample period. 
Descriptive statistics for the RISK1 measure and the independent variables are presented in Panel 
A and Panel B of Table 3 respectively.   
                                                             
48 Following John et al. (2008), we winsorize extreme observations of the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th  
percentiles to avoid spurious inferences generated by the undue influence of outliers. 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The univariate statistics (Panel A of Table 4) demonstrate that family firms, on average, have 
a slightly higher level of risk-taking than non-family firms. Panel B of Table 4 indicates that 
family firms differ from non-family firms in terms of initial firm-level characteristics. 
Specifically, family firms, on average, are smaller (with lower initial firm size), exhibit better 
performance (with higher initial sales growth and higher initial corporate earnings), and use less 
debt in their capital structure (with lower initial book leverage), all of which are in line with 
findings reported in the above section and in previous studies. Particularly, we find that although 
the difference is not significant at conventional levels of significance, family firms have a lower 
level of earnings smoothing (ES2), suggesting that family firms are less involved in earnings 
management or manipulation than non-family firms.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.1.3 Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings 
Informativeness between Family and Non-family firms 
Table 5 and Table 6 respectively present descriptive statistics and univariate statistics for all 
the variables involved in RQ3. In terms of 12-month cumulative return (𝑅𝐸𝑇), although family 
firms appear to perform better than non-family firms (0.1761 for non-family firms versus 0.1774 
for family firms), the t-statistics for the difference-in-means tests indicate that the difference is 
not significant. The average scaled change-in-net-income (𝑁𝐼) is 0.0242 for non-family firms, 
whereas it is 0.0193 for family firms. With respect to risk for bankruptcy (𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆),49 family firms 
are as likely as non-family firms to report a loss. Compared with non-family firms, family firms, 
on average, exhibit better profitability (ROA: 0.0629 for family firms versus 0.0497 for 
non-family firms). Both the results and the implications of descriptive statistics and univariate 
statistics for firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵), and firm age 
                                                             
49 See Wang (2006) on page 631.  
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(𝐴𝐺𝐸) are identical to those presented in Section 4.1.1.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family 
and Non-family Firms 
Table 7 reports the estimates of equation (10) with the logistic transformed relative 
idiosyncratic volatility⁡(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) as the dependent variable. We find that the coefficient on the 
family binary variable⁡(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is positive and significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that 
ceteris paribus, compared with non-family firms, family firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility, 
or alternatively, family firms have higher stock price informativeness. The results are also 
economically significant: after controlling for other firm-level characteristics, on average, 
relative idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) of family firms is about 0.0935 (9.35%) higher than 
that of non-family firms. The coefficients on most of the control variables are consistent with our 
expectations. Especially, the coefficient on earnings smoothing (ES2), an inverse index of 
accounting transparency, is negative, suggesting that firms with higher levels of accounting 
transparency demonstrate higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility (or stock price informativeness), 
a result that is consistent with the theoretical argument that higher quality accounting disclosure 
can encourage more intensive informed trading (i.e. the collection of private information), 
leading to higher firm specific variation and a more informative price (Durnev et al., 2004; 
Ferreira and Laux, 2007).  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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4.2.2 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family 
and Non-family Firms 
Table 8 reports the estimates of equation (11) and (12) in which the corporate risk-taking 
proxy (RISK1) is the dependent variable. We first estimate equation (11) without including the 
family binary variable in it. In column (1), we find that the G-index (𝐺𝑂𝑉) is significantly 
negatively associated with corporate risk-taking (RISK1), suggesting that firms with stronger 
firm-level shareholder protection (i.e. lower G-index or fewer governance provisions) 
demonstrate higher corporate risk-taking levels, a result that is in line with John et al.’s (2008) 
theoretical argument and empirical findings. Moreover, the economic impact of governance 
provisions on corporate risk-taking is also significant. A one standard deviation decrease in the 
G-index increases the corporate risk-taking proxy by 4.35% of its mean.
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We then estimate the full version of equation (11) to test whether family firms undertake 
more or fewer risks than non-family firms do. In column (2), we find that adding the family 
binary variable (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) does not change the negative sign, magnitude, and significance of 
the coefficient on G-index and that the coefficient on 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is significantly negative, 
indicating that family firms, on average, undertake fewer risks than non-family firms do. 
Specifically, ceteris paribus, the average corporate risk-taking level of family firms is 8.49% 
lower than that of non-family firms,
51
 a result that is also economically significant.   
In order to examine whether the impact of governance provisions on corporate risk-taking 
decisions is different between family and non-family firms, we estimate equation (12) in which 
the interaction term between 𝐺𝑂𝑉  and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  (𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚)  is incorporated. In 
column (3), we find that for non-family firms (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡0; ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡0), the 
coefficient (α1 = -0.0004) on 𝐺𝑂𝑉 is still significantly negative (t-statistic = -3.96), which is 
                                                             
50 
0.0002×2.4159
0.0111
× 100% = 4.35% 
51 
0.0009
0.0106
× 100% = 8.49% 
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consistent with John et al.’s (2008) findings for general firms. However, interestingly, for family 
firms (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡1; ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉) , the result indicates that governance 
provisions do not have any influence on their corporate risk-taking decisions. Specifically, the 
t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on 𝐺𝑂𝑉  and 
𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 equals zero (i.e. H0: α1 + α3 = 0) is 0.0071 by which we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis.
52
 One explanation for this result found is that in family firms, families’ monitoring 
functions as the dominant corporate governance mechanism so that governance provisions, 
although being one of the common corporate governance mechanisms in non-family firms, are 
not effective any more or at least do not play a significant role in corporate risk-taking decisions. 
In fact, in family firms, families with even a small percentage of equity holdings would have 
significant power and influence on corporate decision making, thereby weakening or even 
completely eliminating the effects of governance provisions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Wang, 
2006; Chrisman et al., 2010).  
The coefficients on most of the control variables are consistent with our expectations. 
Especially, the coefficient on earnings smoothing (ES2) is significantly negative, suggesting that 
firms with higher levels of earnings smoothing incentives undertake fewer risks (i.e. demonstrate 
lower volatility of corporate earnings). Firm size also has a significantly negative coefficient, 
indicating a negative relationship between firm size and operating risk. All of these results are in 
line with John et al.’s (2008) findings.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
4.2.3 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family 
and Non-family Firms 
Table 9 reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on 
                                                             
52 𝑡 =
𝑎1+𝑎2−0
√𝑣𝑎?̂?(𝑎1+𝑎2)
=
𝑎1+𝑎2
√𝑣𝑎?̂?(𝑎1)+𝑣𝑎?̂?(𝑎2)+2×𝑐𝑜?̂?(𝑎1,⁡𝑎2)
=
−0.00039577+0.00039714
√9.9891099×10−9+4.3932891×10−8+2×(−8.467651×10−9)
= 0.0071 
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the annual changes in net income. Equation (13) potentially suffers from an endogeneity issue. 
Specifically, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and the degree of risk-taking in its operation (RISK1) 
could be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉). Therefore, we use 
two-stage least-squares regressions to estimate equation (13), in which the estimation of equation 
(11) to get the fitted value of RISK1 is the first stage.  
We first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 
𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. In column (1), we find that the coefficients on both the annual change in net 
income (𝑁𝐼) and the test variable (𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) are positive and significant, suggesting 
that the accounting earnings of family firms are more informative than those of non-family firms.  
We then estimate the full version of equation (13), in which the main coefficient of interest 
is that of 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. The result shows that the incorporation of those additional interaction 
variables, which are identified by previous studies as the determinants of ERC, does not change 
the positive sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 . The 
coefficient on 𝑁𝐼  becomes insignificant because the incorporation of those additional 
explanatory interaction variables that involve 𝑁𝐼 may have controlled for most of the variation 
of 𝑁𝐼 and thereby lowered its explanatory power.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Instead of controlling for firm operating risk in equation (13), we alternatively control for 
firm idiosyncratic risk (or stock price informativeness). Because a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and 
idiosyncratic volatility could be jointly impacted by its firm-level shareholder protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉), 
we again apply the two-stage least-squares estimation, in which the estimation of equation (10) 
to get the fitted value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the first stage. Our results remain qualitatively similar under 
this alternative model specification. The coefficient on 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  is positive and 
significant, suggesting that family firms report more informative earnings. Especially, the 
coefficient on the interaction term between earnings and idiosyncratic volatility (𝑁𝐼 × 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) 
is significantly positive, indicating that ceteris paribus, the accounting earnings of those firms 
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that exhibit higher stock price informativeness are more indicative of the firms’ stock returns. 
This result, to some extent, substantiates our findings on family firms’ higher earnings 
informativeness as we previously find that family firms demonstrate higher stock price 
informativeness.  
 [Insert Table 10 Here] 
5 Robustness Tests 
5.1 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative 
Idiosyncratic Volatility Measures 
The 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 measure used in our main test (see Table 7) is the logistic transformed 
relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using weekly stock returns and the market model. 
For robustness, we alternatively construct the 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 measure by using either the market 
model or the industry index model and either daily returns or weekly returns. In addition to the 
relative idiosyncratic volatility, the absolute idiosyncratic volatility is also used for the purpose 
of robustness check.
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 Overall, based on these different methods of construction, 7 alternative 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 measures are created, and our results remain qualitatively similar. Specifically, in Table 
11-1 and Table 11-2, among all of the 7 models, we consistently find that the coefficient on the 
family binary variable⁡(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is positive and significant, suggesting that ceteris paribus, 
compared with non-family firms, family firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility, or 
alternatively, family firms have higher stock price informativeness. 
[Insert Table 11-1 Here] 
                                                             
53 Like the relative idiosyncratic volatility, the absolute idiosyncratic volatility is constructed by using either the market 
model or the industry index model and either daily returns or weekly returns.  
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[Insert Table 11-2 Here] 
5.2 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative 
Corporate Risk-taking Measures 
The RISK1 measure used in our main test (see Table 8) and analysis is constructed based on 
the two-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20) 
under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters. For 
robustness, we alternatively construct the RISK1 measure by using either the one-digit SIC 
industry category or the three-digit SIC industry category. In addition to using different methods 
of industry classification, the required amount of quarters of data to construct the RISK1 measure 
is reduced to 12.
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 Overall, based on these different methods of construction, 5 alternative 
RISK1 measures are created, and our results remain qualitatively similar. Specifically, in Table 12, 
among all of the 5 models, we find: (a) For non-family firms 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡0; ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡0) , the G-index is negatively associated with the 
corporate risk-taking proxy, suggesting that stronger firm-level shareholder protection (lower 
G-index) is associated with a higher level of risk-taking in corporate investment; (b) The sum of 
the coefficients on 𝐺𝑂𝑉 and 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is statistically equal to zero (the t-statistics are 
0.2091, -0.5972, 0.5956, 0.4460, and -0.4240 respectively), indicating that for family firms 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡1; ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚⁡ = ⁡𝐺𝑂𝑉), governance provisions do not have any influence 
on their corporate risk-taking decisions; (c) The coefficient on 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  is significantly 
negative, suggesting that family firms, on average, undertakes fewer risks than non-family firms 
do. All of these results are qualitatively identical to those reported in the main test presented in 
Table 8.  
                                                             
54 In this case, firms should have earnings and total assets available for at least 12 quarters. 
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[Insert Table 12 Here] 
5.3 Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness 
between Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative 
Corporate Risk-taking or Idiosyncratic Volatility Measures as Control 
Variables 
5.3.1 Alternative Corporate Risk-taking Measures  
Because we control for firm operating risk in equation (13), we then examine whether using 
the 5 alternative RISK1 measures would affect our results. In Table 13, the results among all of 
the 5 models show that when we only test for differential informativeness of earnings conditional 
on family presence, the coefficient on our test variable 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  is positive and 
significant and that when other interaction variables are incorporated, the coefficient on 
𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 remains significantly positive, all of which suggest that the accounting earnings 
of family firms exhibit more explanatory power for stock returns than those of non-family firms. 
In particular, the coefficient on the interaction term between 𝑁𝐼 and the 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾1 measure is 
significantly positive consistently across the 5 models, suggesting that firms with higher levels of 
risk-taking in corporate investment report more informative earnings.  
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
5.3.2 Alternative Idiosyncratic Volatility Measures  
When we control for firm idiosyncratic risk in equation (13), it is constructed based on 
weekly stock returns and the market model, which is a regular practice in the literature. For 
robustness, we alternatively use other stock price informativeness proxies constructed by using 
daily returns or the industry index model. In Table 14-2, our corollary that firms with higher 
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stock price informativeness also demonstrate higher earnings informativeness is substantiated 
when the absolute idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴5), instead of the relative idiosyncratic 
volatility (𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) as applied in our main test, is utilized. In particular, across all of the 7 
models in Table 14-1 and Table 14-2, the coefficients on the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼 and 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 are consistently positive and significant, further corroborating our findings in the 
main test that the accounting earnings of family firms are more informative than those of 
non-family firms.  
[Insert Table 14-1 Here] 
[Insert Table 14-2 Here] 
6 Conclusion 
Our study aims to investigate two controversies in the family business literature: whether 
family firms undertake fewer or more risks than non-family firms do, and whether family firms 
exhibit higher or lower information flow, reflected in their stock price informativeness and 
earnings informativeness, to the market. Using a sample of the S&P 500 companies as of 2003 
for the period 2003-2007, we find that compared with non-family firms, the stock prices of 
family firms have more firm specific information impounded and the accounting earnings of 
family firms are more informative and thereby have more explanatory power for stock returns. 
These results are robust to different model specifications and variable proxies. In terms of 
risk-taking levels in corporate investment, our results indicate that family firms, on average, 
undertake fewer risks than non-family firms do. In particular, we find that although G-index is 
negatively associated with corporate risk-taking in non-family firms as John et al. (2008) find for 
general firms, governance provisions do not have any influence on corporate risk-taking 
decisions in family firms. Numerous additional sensitivity tests using different corporate 
risk-taking proxies confirm the robustness of the findings.  
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Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study in the literature that empirically examines family firms’ risk-taking propensity 
relative to that of non-family firms, although a few different theoretical arguments about this 
controversy exist in the literature. Moreover, our study extends and complements John et al.’s 
(2008) findings for general firms by examining whether governance provisions affect corporate 
risk-taking decisions differently between family and non-family firms. Finally, our findings add 
to the extant literature on family firms’ earnings informativeness relative to that of non-family 
firms on which there is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus.  
Our study applies agency theory and corporate governance perspectives to investigate the 
differences between family and nonfamily firms in terms of corporate risk-taking propensity and 
information flow to the market, which can facilitate research scholars in this area, investment 
practitioners, and family businesses themselves to better understand the idiosyncrasies of family 
ownership and control, an ownership and organizational structure that is prevalent in the U.S. 
and even around the world. However, this study does have limitations. First, since only publicly 
traded firms with relatively large size (S&P 500) are investigated, our findings may not apply to 
smaller publicly traded firms and private firms in which family involvement is even more 
dominant. Miller et al. (2007, p. 829) document that research findings from empirical studies on 
family businesses are highly sensitive both to the way by which family firms are defined and 
identified and to the nature of the sample (or the source of the data). Second, in our study, the 
comparison is focused between the U.S. family and non-family firms, suggesting that our results 
may not extend to firms in other countries. Legal systems and the quality and intensity of the 
enforcement of legal rules are considerably different across countries. For instance, outside the 
U.S., legal institutions and mechanisms that are designed to protect minority shareholders’ rights 
may be weak or even nonexistent. Under this circumstance, the relative severity among different 
agency problems and thereby the differences in corporate risk-taking levels and information flow 
to the market between family and non-family firms may be different across countries. These 
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limitations may constitute potential avenues for future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family and Non-family Firms  
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the volatility variables, 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 and 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, over our sample period (2003—2007). 
We construct each of these volatility variables for each sample year 𝑡, generating 2327 firm-year observations. 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the 
logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using weekly stock returns and the market model; 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
is the natural logarithm of systematic risk constructed by using weekly stock returns and the market model. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Mean Median STDEV N Minimum Maximum
IdioVol 1.1550 1.0284 1.0689 2327 -0.8578 5.4017
SysRisk -8.2893 -8.2440 1.1629 2327 -12.3710 -5.7669
GOV 9.7440 10.0000 2.4159 2363 3.0000 16.0000
ROE 0.1663 0.1502 0.2879 2351 -1.0007 1.7380
VROE 0.0132 0.0003 0.0704 2281 0.0000 0.6300
LEV 0.1917 0.1670 0.1467 2343 0.0000 0.6399
M/B 1.1086 1.0505 0.6428 2111 -0.1610 3.3626
SIZE 9.3301 9.2755 1.1449 2162 6.7773 12.3151
DD 0.6724 1.0000 0.4694 2500 0.0000 1.0000
AGE 3.3403 3.4965 0.7592 2488 1.3652 4.4248
DIVER 0.7359 1.0000 0.4410 1795 0.0000 1.0000
ES2 0.1727 0.2413 0.4858 1827 -1.6340 0.9025Earnings smoothing
Leverage
Market-to-book
Market capitalization
Dividend dummy
Firm age
Diversification dummy
SysRisk
Panel B: Independent Variables
Governance index (i.e. G-index)
Return-on-equity
Volatility of return-on-equity
Variable
Panel A: Volatility Variables
IdioVol
69 
 
Table 2: Univariate Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family and Non-family Firms 
This table reports univariate statistics, including difference-in-means tests, for all the variables between family and non-family 
firms. Please refer to Appendix A and Table 1 for variable definitions. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
  
Firm Type N Mean STDEV
Difference 
(t-statistics)
Non-family Firm 1516 1.1130 1.0644 -0.1205***
Family Firm 811 1.2335 1.0735 (-2.59)
Non-family Firm 1516 -8.3458 1.1318 -0.1622***
Family Firm 811 -8.1836 1.2126 (-3.15)
Non-family Firm 1514 9.9432 2.3389 0.5545***
Family Firm 849 9.3887 2.5098 (5.28)
Non-family Firm 1530 0.1685 0.2995 0.0063
Family Firm 821 0.1622 0.2651 (-0.52)
Non-family Firm 1475 0.0148 0.0772 0.0046
Family Firm 806 0.0102 0.0558 (1.63)
Non-family Firm 1529 0.2033 0.1421 0.0336***
Family Firm 814 0.1697 0.1526 (5.20)
Non-family Firm 1369 1.0466 0.6479 -0.1765***
Family Firm 742 1.2231 0.6175 (-6.07)
Non-family Firm 1410 9.3483 1.1873 0.0524
Family Firm 752 9.2959 1.0608 (1.05)
Non-family Firm 1615 0.7152 0.4515 0.1208***
Family Firm 885 0.5944 0.4913 (6.20)
Non-family Firm 1607 3.4311 0.7864 0.2563***
Family Firm 881 3.1747 0.6766 (8.16)
Non-family Firm 1131 0.7622 0.4620 0.0709***
Family Firm 664 0.6913 0.4623 (3.30)
Non-family Firm 1146 0.1836 0.4940 0.0292
Family Firm 681 0.1544 0.4716 (1.24)
Variable
Panel A: Volatility Variables
IdioVol
VROE
SysRisk
Panel B: Independent Variables
GOV
ROE
ES2
LEV
M/B
SIZE
DD
AGE
DIVER
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family and Non-family firms 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the RISK1 measure over our sample period (2003—2007). RISK1 is the industry-adjusted 
volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the two-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 20 
quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters. Panel B 
reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Please refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
  
Mean Median STDEV N Minimum Maximum
RISK1 0.0111 0.0088 0.0086 2076 0.0007 0.0476
GOV 9.7440 10.0000 2.4159 2363 3.0000 16.0000
InitialSalesGrowth 0.1042 0.0869 0.1102 2435 -0.1239 0.5640
InitialBookLeverage 0.6517 0.6666 0.2274 2060 0.1406 1.0681
LogInitialFirmSize 9.3410 9.2690 1.4317 2490 6.7790 13.5096
InitialCorporateEarnings 0.1217 0.1130 0.0773 2440 -0.0455 0.3314
ES2 0.1727 0.2413 0.4858 1827 -1.6340 0.9025
Panel B: Independent Variables
Panel A: Dependent Variable
Initial corporate earnings
Earnings smoothing 
Governance index (i.e. G-index)
Initial sales growth
Initial book leverage
Initial firm size
Variable
Corporate risk-taking proxy
71 
 
Table 4: Univariate Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family and Non-family firms 
This table reports univariate statistics, including difference-in-means tests, for all the variables between family and non-family 
firms. RISK1 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the two-digit SIC industry category 
and by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available 
for at least 20 quarters. For information about the independent variables, please refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm Type N Mean STDEV
Difference 
(t-statistics)
Non-family Firm 1369 0.0106 0.0084 -0.0017***
Family Firm 707 0.0123 0.0088 (-4.33)
Non-family Firm 1514 9.9432 2.3389 0.5545***
Family Firm 849 9.3887 2.5098 (5.28)
Non-family Firm 1575 0.0988 0.1089 -0.0153***
Family Firm 860 0.1141 0.1122 (-3.28)
Non-family Firm 1315 0.6984 0.2147 0.1293***
Family Firm 745 0.5691 0.2258 (12.89)
Non-family Firm 1615 9.5649 1.5146 0.6371***
Family Firm 875 8.9278 1.1565 (11.73)
Non-family Firm 1590 0.1168 0.0763 -0.0139***
Family Firm 850 0.1308 0.0785 (-4.25)
Non-family Firm 1146 0.1836 0.4940 0.0292
Family Firm 681 0.1544 0.4716 (1.24)
LogInitialFirmSize
Variable
Panel A: Dependent Variable
RISK1
Panel B: Independent Variables
GOV
InitialSalesGrowth
InitialBookLeverage
InitialCorporateEarnings
ES2
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family and Non-family firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all the variables involved in RQ3.⁡𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return ending 
three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡. Since a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and the degree of risk-taking in its operation 
(RISK1) could be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉), we use two-stage least-squares regressions to 
estimate equation (13), in which the estimation of equation (11) to get the fitted value of RISK1 (RISK1Fit) is the first stage. For 
information about other variables, please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean Median STDEV N Minimum Maximum
RET 0.1766 0.1322 0.3667 2345 -0.6465 1.5606
NI 0.0225 0.0076 0.1257 2187 -0.4324 0.8014
SIZE 9.3301 9.2755 1.1449 2162 6.7773 12.3151
LEV 0.1917 0.1670 0.1467 2343 0.0000 0.6399
MB 1.1086 1.0505 0.6428 2111 -0.1610 3.3626
AGE 3.3403 3.4965 0.7592 2488 1.3652 4.4248
LOSS 0.0974 0.0000 0.2966 2351 0.0000 1.0000
RISK1Fit 0.0122 0.0121 0.0041 1521 0.0007 0.0266
ROA 0.0543 0.0497 0.0667 2351 -0.2384 0.2264
Loss dummy
RISK1Fit
Return-on-assets
Firm age
Variable
Scaled change-in-net-income
Firm size
Firm leverage
Market-to-book
12-month cumulative return
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Table 6: Univariate Statistics for Variables Involved in Regression Analysis on the 
Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family and Non-family firms 
This table reports univariate statistics, including difference-in-means tests, for all the variables between family and non-family 
firms. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡. RISK1Fit is the fitted value of 
RISK1 obtained from equation (11). For information about other variables, please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
 
  
Firm Type N Mean STDEV
Difference 
(t-statistics)
Non-family Firm 1526 0.1761 0.3557 -0.0013
Family Firm 819 0.1774 0.3865 (-0.08)
Non-family Firm 1422 0.0242 0.1316 0.0050
Family Firm 765 0.0193 0.1137 (0.92)
Non-family Firm 1410 9.3483 1.1873  0.0524
Family Firm 752 9.2959 1.0608 (1.05)
Non-family Firm 1529 0.2033 0.1421  0.0336***
Family Firm 814 0.1697 0.1526 (5.20)
Non-family Firm 1369 1.0466 0.6479  -0.1765***
Family Firm 742 1.2231 0.6175 (-6.07)
Non-family Firm 1607 3.4311 0.7864  0.2563***
Family Firm 881 3.1747 0.6766 (8.16)
Non-family Firm 1530 0.0974 0.2966 -0.0001
Family Firm 821 0.0974 0.2967 (-0.00)
Non-family Firm 949 0.0118 0.0042  -0.0010***
Family Firm 572 0.0128 0.0038 (-4.60)
Non-family Firm 1530 0.0497 0.0654 -0.0132***
Family Firm 821 0.0629 0.0682 (-4.60)
RISK1Fit
ROA
AGE
LOSS
Variable
RET
NI
SIZE
LEV
MB
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Table 7: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Relative Idiosyncratic Volatility between 
Family and Non-family Firms 
This table reports the estimates of equation (10) with the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility⁡(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) as the 
dependent variable. 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using weekly stock 
returns and the market model; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by 
Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; control variables include 𝐺𝑂𝑉—the IRRC governance index constructed by 
Gompers et al. (2003), profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐸), profitability volatility (𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸), leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), market to book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), 
market capitalization (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), dividend dummy (𝐷𝐷), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), diversification dummy (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅), earnings smoothing 
(𝐸𝑆2), and systematic risk (𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘). Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 
10% level.   
 
IdioVol
FamFirm 0.0935**
(2.31)
GOV -0.0029
(-0.38)
ROE -0.5715***
(-5.68)
VROE 1.4071***
(3.56)
LEV -0.3235*
(-1.74)
M/B 0.0832*
(1.86)
SIZE -0.1260***
(-6.55)
DD -0.3369***
(-5.32)
AGE -0.1173***
(-4.16)
DIVER -0.0200
(-0.42)
SysRisk -0.8452***
(-36.83)
ES2 -0.0174
(-0.95)
Intercept -3.9520***
(-15.46)
N 1100
Ajusted R
2
0.7206
Industry Effects Yes
Year Effects Yes
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Table 8: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between Family 
and Non-family Firms 
This table reports the estimates of equation (11) and (12) in which the corporate risk-taking proxy (RISK1) is the dependent 
variable (In column (1), we first estimate equation (11) without including the family binary variable in it). RISK1 is the 
industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the two-digit SIC industry category and by using the most 
recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters; 
𝐺𝑂𝑉 is the IRRC governance index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003); 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one 
when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; control variables for fundamental 
firm-level characteristics include initial firm size (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), initial book leverage (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒), initial 
sales growth (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), initial corporate earnings (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠), and earnings smoothing (𝐸𝑆2). 
Please refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
   
(1) (2) (3)
GOV -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0004***
(-2.42) (-2.48) (-3.96)
FamFirm -0.0009* -0.0047**
(-1.79) (-2.23)
GOV_FamFirm 0.0004*
(1.89)
InitialSalesGrowth -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0023
(-1.10) (-0.91) (-1.07)
InitialBookLeverage -0.0024 -0.0027* -0.0026*
(-1.53) (-1.74) (-1.69)
LogInitialFirmSize -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0016***
(-6.38) (-6.57) (-6.81)
InitialCorporateEarnings 0.0040 0.0041 0.0037
(1.09) (1.12) (1.03)
ES2 -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0026***
(-5.34) (-5.36) (-5.21)
Intercept 0.0315*** 0.0324*** 0.0343***
(11.89) (12.25) (12.93)
N 1420 1420 1420
Ajusted R
2
0.1971 0.1985 0.2006
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
RISK1
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Table 9: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms (Controlling for Firm Operating Risk) 
This table reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on the annual changes in net income (In 
column (1), we first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚.). Equation (13) 
potentially suffers from an endogeneity issue. Specifically, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and the degree of risk-taking in its 
operation (RISK1) could be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉) . Therefore, we use two-stage 
least-squares regressions to estimate equation (13), in which the estimation of equation (11) to get the fitted value of RISK1 is the 
first stage. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; 𝑁𝐼 is the scaled change 
in net income; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week 
(2003), and zero otherwise; other independent variables include firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), 
market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵), return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴), loss dummy⁡(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), and the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼 and all of 
these separate variables including 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. Please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit 
SIC industry fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 9: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms (Controlling for Firm Operating Risk) 
   
RET RET
(1) (2)
NI 0.7337*** -0.1767
(6.66) (-0.18)
NI×FamFirm 0.5660*** 0.6474***
(2.67) (2.95)
NI×RISK1 22.0385**
(2.35)
NI×SIZE -0.0551
(-0.62)
NI×LEV -2.1051***
(-2.97)
NI×MB -0.3386**
(-2.45)
NI×AGE 0.5642***
(4.73)
NI×LOSS -0.0166
(-0.06)
NI×ROA -0.5649
(-0.39)
FamFirm 0.0194 0.0165
(0.94) (0.81)
RISK1Fit -4.1769 -4.9913
(-0.76) (-0.91)
SIZE -0.0034 -0.0049
(-0.31) (-0.44)
LEV -0.0941 -0.0837
(-1.00) (-0.89)
MB 0.0938*** 0.1055***
(5.02) (5.60)
AGE -0.0006 -0.0059
(-0.04) (-0.43)
LOSS -0.0632 -0.0616
(-1.51) (-1.48)
ROA -0.6645*** -0.7922***
(-2.82) (-3.35)
Intercept 0.1692 0.2092
(1.00) (1.25)
N 1358 1358
Ajusted R
2
0.1150 0.1344
Industry Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No No
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Table 10: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms (Controlling for Firm Idiosyncratic Risk) 
This table reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on the annual changes in net income (In 
column (1), we first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚.). Instead of 
controlling for firm operating risk in equation (13) as presented in Table 9, we alternatively control for firm idiosyncratic risk (or 
stock price informativeness). However, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and idiosyncratic volatility could be jointly impacted by its 
firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉). Therefore, we use two-stage least-squares regressions to estimate equation (13), in which 
the estimation of equation (10) to get the fitted value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the first stage. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; 𝑁𝐼 is the scaled change in net income; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is 
equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; other independent 
variables include firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵), return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴), 
loss dummy⁡(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), and the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼 and all of these separate variables including 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. Please refer 
to Appendix C for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 10: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms (Controlling for Firm Idiosyncratic Risk) 
  
RET RET
(1) (2)
NI 0.5801*** -1.4623
(3.58) (-1.11)
NI×FamFirm 0.9417*** 1.0937***
(3.70) (3.84)
NI×IdioVol 0.2270*
(1.72)
NI×SIZE 0.0912
(0.68)
NI×LEV -1.2148
(-1.28)
NI×MB 0.4022*
(1.76)
NI×AGE 0.3198*
(1.81)
NI×LOSS -0.3270
(-0.85)
NI×ROA -0.5036
(-0.32)
FamFirm 0.0123 0.0085
(0.67) (0.46)
IdioVolFit 0.0432*** 0.0416***
(4.26) (4.11)
SIZE 0.0023 0.0021
(0.25) (0.23)
LEV -0.1116 -0.1223
(-1.34) (-1.47)
MB 0.0715*** 0.0727***
(3.85) (3.88)
AGE 0.0150 0.0131
(1.23) (1.06)
LOSS -0.1542*** -0.1546***
(-3.81) (-3.81)
ROA -0.2956 -0.3658
(-1.35) (-1.64)
Intercept -0.0752 -0.0587
(-0.83) (-0.65)
N 1087 1087
Ajusted R
2
0.1884 0.1954
Industry Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No No
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Table 11-1: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Relative 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  
This table reports the estimates of equation (10) with the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility⁡(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙) as the 
dependent variable. 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴1 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using daily stock 
returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴2 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using daily 
stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴3 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed 
by using weekly stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is 
a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; control variables include 𝐺𝑂𝑉—the IRRC governance 
index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003), profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐸), profitability volatility (𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸), leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), market to 
book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), market capitalization (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), dividend dummy (𝐷𝐷), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), diversification dummy (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅), 
earnings smoothing (𝐸𝑆2), and systematic risk (𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) (𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 in each column refers to 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴1, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴2, and 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴3 respectively). Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
 
IdioVol_A1 IdioVol_A2 IdioVol_A3
(1) (2) (3)
FamFirm 0.0646** 0.1435** 0.1436*
(1.98) (2.03) (1.93)
GOV 0.0007 -0.0131 -0.0103
(0.11) (-0.67) (-0.52)
ROE -0.4328*** -0.6888*** -0.7799***
(-5.31) (-3.70) (-3.98)
VROE 1.1341*** 2.0531*** 2.3717***
(3.56) (3.70) (4.06)
LEV 0.0058 -0.2106 -0.2772
(0.04) (-0.55) (-0.69)
M/B 0.0373 0.1321 0.1311
(1.01) (1.58) (1.55)
SIZE -0.1296*** -0.4216*** -0.4076***
(-7.97) (-8.82) (-8.27)
DD -0.3375*** -0.3813*** -0.3494***
( -9.08) (-4.08) (-3.58)
AGE -0.1121*** -0.2078*** -0.2369***
( -4.61) (-3.22) (-3.52)
DIVER -0.0202 0.1946** 0.2481**
(0.51) (1.99) (2.39)
SysRisk -0.7106*** -1.1113*** -1.0623***
(-28.14) (-17.80) (-19.30)
ES2 -0.0238 -0.1931*** -0.1778***
(-1.63) (-3.57) (-3.13)
Intercept -3.8634*** -5.7390*** -3.8391***
(-13.71) (-6.50) (13.45)
N 1100 921 921
Ajusted R
2
0.5928 0.5292 0.5394
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11-2: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Idiosyncratic Volatility between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Absolute 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  
This table reports the estimates of equation (10) with the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility⁡(𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜎𝑖𝜖
2 )) as the 
dependent variable. 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴4 is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using daily stock 
returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴5 is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using 
weekly stock returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴6 is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility constructed 
by using daily stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴7⁡is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic 
volatility constructed by using weekly stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to 
one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; control variables include 
𝐺𝑂𝑉—the IRRC governance index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003), profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐸), profitability volatility (𝑉𝑅𝑂𝐸), 
leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), market to book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), market capitalization (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), dividend dummy (𝐷𝐷), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), 
diversification dummy (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅), earnings smoothing (𝐸𝑆2), and systematic risk (𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) (𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 in each column refers 
to 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴4, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴5, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴6, and 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴7 respectively). Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
 
IdioVol_A4 IdioVol_A5 IdioVol_A6 IdioVol_A7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FamFirm 0.0483  0.0877** 0.01445* 0.1718**
(1.53) (2.30) (1.81) (2.08)
GOV 0.0003  -0.0036 -0.0122 -0.0146
(0.05) (-0.49) (-0.63) (-0.74)
ROE -0.4258***   -0.5168*** -0.7812*** -0.8866***
(-5.61) (-6.20) (-4.21) (-4.59)
VROE 1.0482*** 1.2000*** 2.5028*** 2.7732***
(3.54) (3.83) (4.46) (4.79)
LEV 0.0105 -0.3170* -0.5944** -0.6422**
(0.08) (-1.89) (-1.99) (-2.07)
M/B 0.0467 0.0734* 0.0965 0.1149
(1.33) (1.72) (1.18) (1.36)
SIZE  -0.1281*** -0.1312*** -0.4322*** -0.4176***
(-7.91) (-6.74) (-8.87) (-8.42)
DD -0.3283*** -0.3043*** -0.4973*** -0.4780***
(-8.99) (-7.11) (-5.42) (-5.04)
AGE  -0.1128*** -0.1199*** -0.2286*** -0.2564***
(-4.80) (-4.48) (-3.24) (3.57)
DIVER -0.0094 0.0308 0.0889 0.1235
(-0.25) (0.67) (0.65) (1.15)
SysRisk 0.2990*** 0.1431*** -0.0036 -0.0067
(12.07) (6.28) (-0.06) (-0.13)
ES2 -0.0220 -0.0197 -0.2126*** -0.1968***
(-1.49) (-1.11) (-3.42) (-3.09)
Intercept  -3.7970***  -3.9834*** -4.1733*** -2.7972***
(-13.90) (-16.96) (-5.96) (-4.37)
N 1100 1100 921 921
Ajusted R
2
0.6049 0.5054 0.2334 0.2243
Industry Effects Yes Yes No No
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Corporate 
Risk-taking Measures 
This table reports the estimates of equation (11) and (12) in which the corporate risk-taking proxy (RISK1) is the dependent 
variable. The RISK1 measure used in our main test (see Table 8) and analysis is constructed based on the two-digit SIC industry 
category and by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20) under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets 
available for at least 20 quarters. For the purpose of robustness check, we alternatively construct the RISK1 measure by using 
either the one-digit SIC industry category or the three-digit SIC industry category. In addition to using different methods of 
industry classification, the required amount of quarters of data to construct the RISK1 measure is reduced to 12. Overall, based on 
these different methods of construction, 5 alternative RISK1 measures are created: RISK1_A1 is the industry-adjusted volatility of 
corporate earnings, constructed based on the one-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 12 quarters of data 
(𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 12 quarters; RISK1_A2 is the 
industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the one-digit SIC industry category and by using the most 
recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters; 
RISK1_A3 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the two-digit SIC industry category and 
by using the most recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for 
at least 12 quarters; RISK1_A4 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the three-digit SIC 
industry category and by using the most recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and 
total assets available for at least 12 quarters; RISK1_A5 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based 
on the three-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms 
have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters. 𝐺𝑂𝑉 is the IRRC governance index constructed by Gompers et 
al. (2003); 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week 
(2003), and zero otherwise; control variables for fundamental firm-level characteristics include initial firm size 
(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), initial book leverage (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒), initial sales growth (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), initial 
corporate earnings (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠), and earnings smoothing (𝐸𝑆2). Please refer to Appendix B for variable 
definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2003 to 
2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 
5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 12: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Corporate Risk-taking between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Corporate 
Risk-taking Measures 
  
RISK1_A1 RISK1_A2 RISK1_A3 RISK1_A4 RISK1_A5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GOV -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(-5.85) (-5.37) (-5.43) (-6.29) (-5.45)
FamFirm -0.0047** -0.0044** -0.0052*** -0.0050*** -0.0040**
(-2.43) (-2.03) (-2.73) (-2.78) (-2.06)
GOV_FamFirm 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004**
(2.72) (2.02) (2.77) (2.98) (2.14)
InitialSalesGrowth -0.0015 0.0009 -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0027
(-0.62) (0.38) (-2.65) (-3.08) (-1.48)
InitialBookLeverage 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0023** -0.0039***
(0.70) (-0.50) (-1.37) (-2.13) (-3.23)
LogInitialFirmSize -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0014***
(-8.53) (-7.11) (-8.36) (-10.11) (-7.55)
InitialCorporateEarnings 0.0096*** 0.0034 0.0089*** 0.0086*** 0.0033
(2.83) (0.89) (2.80) (3.16) (1.10)
ES2 -0.0019*** -0.0034*** -0.0004** -0.0010** -0.0021***
(-3.97) (-6.61) (-2.09) (-2.41) (-4.61)
Intercept 0.0204*** 0.0354*** 0.0310*** 0.0293*** 0.0312***
(10.01) (3.97) (13.44) (15.81) (14.50)
N 1446 1420 1463 1446 1420
Ajusted R
2
0.1304 0.1375 0.2041 0.1271 0.1119
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Corporate 
Risk-taking Measures as Control Variables 
This table reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on the annual changes in net income (In 
column (1) (3) (5) (7) (9), we first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚.). 
Equation (13) potentially suffers from an endogeneity issue. Specifically, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and the degree of 
risk-taking in its operation (RISK1) could be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉). Therefore, we use 
two-stage least-squares regressions to estimate equation (13), in which the estimation of equation (11) to get the fitted value of 
RISK1 is the first stage. As presented in Table 12, based on different methods of construction, 5 alternative RISK1 measures are 
created. We then examine whether using the 5 alternative RISK1 measures would affect our results. RISK1_A1 is the 
industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the one-digit SIC industry category and by using the most 
recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 12 quarters; 
RISK1_A2 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the one-digit SIC industry category and 
by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for 
at least 20 quarters; RISK1_A3 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based on the two-digit SIC 
industry category and by using the most recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms have earnings and 
total assets available for at least 12 quarters; RISK1_A4 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, constructed based 
on the three-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 12 quarters of data (𝑇 = 12)⁡under the condition that firms 
have earnings and total assets available for at least 12 quarters; RISK1_A5 is the industry-adjusted volatility of corporate earnings, 
constructed based on the three-digit SIC industry category and by using the most recent 20 quarters of data (𝑇 = 20)⁡under the 
condition that firms have earnings and total assets available for at least 20 quarters; 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; 𝑁𝐼 is the scaled change in net income; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is 
equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; other independent 
variables include firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵), return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴), 
loss dummy⁡(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), and the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼 and all of these separate variables including 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. Please refer 
to Appendix C for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 13: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family and Non-family 
Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Corporate Risk-taking Measures as Control Variables 
 
RET RET RET RET RET RET RET RET RET RET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
NI 0.7015*** -0.9276 NI 0.7298*** -0.2356 NI 0.6924*** -0.8815 NI 0.7013*** -1.0328 NI 0.7326*** -0.1827
(6.48) (-1.01) (6.62) (-0.24) (6.11) (-0.93) (6.46) (-1.12) (6.67) (-0.19)
NI×FamFirm 0.7857*** 0.8359*** NI×FamFirm 0.5720*** 0.6411*** NI×FamFirm 0.7605*** 0.8411*** NI×FamFirm 0.7777*** 0.8227*** NI×FamFirm 0.5702*** 0.5904***
(4.06) (4.25) (2.70) (2.92) (3.75) (4.11) (4.01) (4.19) (2.70) (2.75)
NI×RISK1_A1 26.7688*** NI×RISK1_A2 17.7566** NI×RISK1_A3 31.8777*** NI×RISK1_A4 35.8938*** NI×RISK1_A5 23.6684**
(2.84) (2.01) (2.93) (3.22) (2.28)
NI×SIZE 0.0157 NI×SIZE -0.0428 NI×SIZE 0.0068 NI×SIZE 0.0205 NI×SIZE -0.0519
(0.18) (-0.49) (0.08) (0.24) (-0.59)
NI×LEV -2.0990*** NI×LEV -2.0512*** NI×LEV -2.0681*** NI×LEV -2.0686*** NI×LEV -2.1195***
(-3.14) (-2.86) (-2.99) (-3.09) (-3.01)
NI×MB -0.2598* NI×MB -0.3277** NI×MB -0.2801** NI×MB -0.2552* NI×MB -0.3151**
(-1.93) (-2.38) (-2.00) (-1.90) (-2.30)
NI×AGE 0.5730*** NI×AGE 0.5593*** NI×AGE 0.5671*** NI×AGE 0.5745*** NI×AGE 0.5575***
(4.97) (4.69) (4.75) (4.98) (4.71)
NI×LOSS 0.0660 NI×LOSS -0.0266 NI×LOSS 0.0812 NI×LOSS 0.0380 NI×LOSS -0.0370
(0.24) (-0.09) (0.28) (0.14) (-0.13)
NI×ROA -0.7316 NI×ROA -0.6506 NI×ROA -0.5786 NI×ROA -0.6082 NI×ROA -0.7510
(-0.56) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.46) (-0.53)
FamFirm 0.0106 0.0077 FamFirm 0.0197 0.0176 FamFirm 0.0167 0.0124 FamFirm 0.0152 0.0107 FamFirm 0.0207 0.0181
(0.52) (0.38) (0.96) (0.87) (0.79) (0.60) (0.73) (0.52) (1.00) (0.88)
RISK1_A1Fit 0.6849 0.1051 RISK1_A2Fit 2.8823 1.7083 RISK1_A3Fit -16.4090** -14.9350** RISK1_A4Fit -5.0207 -4.3036 RISK1_A5Fit -0.2396 -0.0707
(0.11) (0.02) (0.71) (0.43) (-2.21) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-0.73) (-0.05) (-0.01)
SIZE -0.0008 -0.0032 SIZE 0.0031 0.0011 SIZE -0.0179 -0.0180 SIZE -0.0068 -0.0077 SIZE 0.0001 -0.0006
(-0.07) (-0.27) (0.29) (0.10) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-0.58) (-0.66) (0.01) (-0.06)
LEV -0.0972 -0.0825 LEV -0.0441 -0.0381 LEV -0.1847* -0.1591* LEV -0.1222 -0.1031 LEV -0.0686 -0.0518
(-1.07) (-0.91) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-1.90) (-1.66) (-1.37) (-1.16) (-0.75) (-0.57)
MB 0.0999*** 0.1119*** MB 0.0924*** 0.1047*** MB 0.1061*** 0.1171*** MB 0.1026*** 0.1134*** MB 0.0936*** 0.1050***
(5.39) (5.98) (4.93) (5.56) (5.52) (6.12) (5.57) (6.12) (5.03) (5.61)
AGE -0.0006 -0.0053 AGE 0.0035 -0.0022 AGE -0.0060 -0.0099 AGE -0.0034 -0.0075 AGE 0.0015 -0.0032
(-0.04) (-0.40) (0.26) (-0.16) (-0.43) (-0.72) (-0.25) (-0.56) (0.11) (-0.23)
LOSS -0.0675* -0.0619 LOSS -0.0688* -0.0663 LOSS -0.0530 -0.0497 LOSS -0.0632 -0.0606 LOSS -0.0667 -0.0672
(-1.66) (-1.52) (-1.65) (-1.60) (-1.23) (-1.18) (-1.54) (-1.49) (-1.61) (-1.62)
ROA -0.8255*** -0.9725*** ROA -0.7193*** -0.8543*** ROA -0.6265** -0.7924*** ROA -0.7581*** -0.9085*** ROA -0.6989*** -0.8371***
(-3.57) (-4.21) (-3.10) (-3.69) (-2.51) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-3.87) (-2.98) (-3.56)
Intercept 0.0810 0.1227 Intercept -0.0097 0.0414 Intercept 0.4587** 0.4524** Intercept 0.1966 0.2106 Intercept 0.0700 0.0867
(0.50) (0.76) (-0.07) (0.29) (2.38) (2.40) (1.29) (1.39) (0.48) (0.60)
N 1381 1381 N 1358 1358 N 1381 1381 N 1381 1381 N 1358 1358
Ajusted R
2
0.1309 0.1510 Ajusted R
2
0.1151 0.1342 Ajusted R
2
0.1215 0.1436 Ajusted R
2
0.1304 0.1523 Ajusted R
2
0.1158 0.1354
Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No
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Table 14-1: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Relative 
Idiosyncratic Volatility as Control Variables 
This table reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on the annual changes in net income (In 
column (1) (3) (5), we first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚.). Instead 
of controlling for firm operating risk in equation (13) as presented in Table 9 and Table 13, we alternatively control for firm 
idiosyncratic risk (or stock price informativeness). However, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and idiosyncratic volatility could be 
jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉). Therefore, we use two-stage least-squares regressions to estimate 
equation (13), in which the estimation of equation (10) to get the fitted value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the first stage. In our main test (see 
Table 10) and analysis, when we control for firm idiosyncratic risk in equation (13), it is constructed based on using weekly stock 
returns and the market model, which is a regular practice in the literature. For the purpose of robustness check, we alternatively 
use other stock price informativeness proxies constructed by using daily returns or the industry index model, by which 3 
alternative measures are created: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴1 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using 
daily stock returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴2 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility constructed by 
using daily stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴3 is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility 
constructed by using weekly stock returns and the industry index model. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative raw return ending three 
months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; 𝑁𝐼 is the scaled change in net income; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary variable that is equal to one 
when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; other independent variables include 
firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) , firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉) , firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸) , market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵) , return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) , loss 
dummy⁡(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), and the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼 and all of these separate variables including 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. Please refer to 
Appendix C for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table14-1: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Relative 
Idiosyncratic Volatility as Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
RET RET RET RET RET RET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NI 0.5272*** -1.3656 NI 0.4641*** -0.6905 NI 0.4755*** -0.5974
(3.23) (-0.98) (2.64) (-0.39) (2.71) (-0.34)
NI×FamFirm 0.9239*** 1.1555*** NI×FamFirm 0.9346*** 1.2691*** NI×FamFirm 0.9649*** 1.3161***
(3.62) (4.09) (3.30) (3.86) (3.43) (3.95)
NI×IdioVol_A1 0.1553 NI×IdioVol_A2 -0.2097 NI×IdioVol_A3 -0.1831
(0.83) (-1.49) (-1.58)
NI×SIZE 0.0906 NI×SIZE 0.2123 NI×SIZE 0.2080
(0.64) (1.10) (1.09)
NI×LEV -1.3748 NI×LEV -0.5264 NI×LEV -0.9644
(-1.44) (-0.49) (-0.95)
NI×MB 0.3768 NI×MB 0.0478 NI×MB 0.0726
(1.63) (0.18) (0.27)
NI×AGE 0.3349* NI×AGE -0.1271 NI×AGE -0.1098
(1.89) (-0.52) (-0.46)
NI×LOSS -0.4968 NI×LOSS -0.4621 NI×LOSS -0.5559
(-1.27) (-1.09) (-1.34)
NI×ROA -1.1223 NI×ROA -1.3198 NI×ROA -2.2227
(-0.72) (-0.72) (-1.19)
FamFirm 0.0119 0.0058 FamFirm 0.0191 0.0137 FamFirm 0.0195 0.0136
(0.64) (0.31) (0.90) (0.64) (0.92) (0.64)
IdioVol_A1Fit 0.0976*** 0.0982*** IdioVol_A2Fit 0.0498*** 0.0520*** IdioVol_A3Fit 0.0399*** 0.0404***
(5.49) (5.51) (3.92) (4.07) (3.54) (3.59)
SIZE 0.0097 0.0093 SIZE 0.0255** 0.0245** SIZE 0.0197* 0.0180
(1.04) (1.00) (2.15) (2.05) (1.74) (1.58)
LEV -0.1411* -0.1535* LEV -0.0587 -0.0512 LEV -0.0550 -0.0468
(-1.69) (-1.84) (-0.62) (-0.53) (-0.58) (-0.49)
MB 0.0708*** 0.0730*** MB 0.0885*** 0.0913*** MB 0.0889*** 0.0914***
(3.80) (3.87) (4.37) (4.47) (4.41) (4.50)
AGE 0.0233* 0.0218* AGE 0.0329** 0.0324** AGE 0.0328** 0.0326**
(1.87) (1.74) (2.10) (2.04) (2.11) (2.06)
LOSS -0.1527*** -0.1554*** LOSS -0.1232*** -0.1203*** LOSS -0.1219*** -0.1173**
(-3.76) (-3.82) (-2.72) (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.58)
ROA -0.2172 -0.2723 ROA -0.3869 -0.4194 ROA -0.4167* -0.4396*
(-0.99) (-1.22) (-1.55) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.73)
Intercept -0.2430** -0.2299** Intercept -0.2789** -0.2717** Intercept -0.2240* -0.2111*
(-2.41) (-2.28) (-2.34) (-2.26) (-1.96) (-1.84)
N 1087 1087 N 898 898 N 898 898
Ajusted R
2
0.1945 0.2006 Ajusted R
2
0.1856 0.1872 Ajusted R
2
0.1851 0.1873
Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No
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Table 14-2: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between 
Family and Non-family Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Absolute 
Idiosyncratic Volatility as Control Variables 
This table reports the estimates of equation (13) in which the annual returns are regressed on the annual changes in net income (In 
column (1) (3) (5) (7), we first estimate equation (13) without including those interaction terms except for 𝑁𝐼 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚.). 
Instead of controlling for firm operating risk in equation (13) as presented in Table 9 and Table 13, we alternatively control for 
firm idiosyncratic risk (or stock price informativeness). However, a firm’s stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇) and idiosyncratic volatility could 
be jointly impacted by its firm-level investor protection (𝐺𝑂𝑉). Therefore, we use two-stage least-squares regressions to 
estimate equation (13), in which the estimation of equation (10) to get the fitted value of 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙 is the first stage. In Table 10 
and Table 14-1, when we control for firm idiosyncratic risk in equation (13), it is constructed as the logistic transformed relative 
idiosyncratic volatility. For the purpose of robustness check, we alternatively use the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic 
volatility⁡constructed by using either daily returns or weekly returns and either the market model or the industry index model, by 
which 4 alternative measures are created: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴4 is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility constructed by 
using daily stock returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴5 is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic volatility 
constructed by using weekly stock returns and the market model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴6⁡is the natural logarithm of absolute idiosyncratic 
volatility constructed by using daily stock returns and the industry index model; 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐴7 is the natural logarithm of absolute 
idiosyncratic volatility constructed by using weekly stock returns and the industry index model. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is 12-month cumulative 
raw return ending three months after the fiscal year-end at 𝑡; 𝑁𝐼 is the scaled change in net income; 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a binary 
variable that is equal to one when the firm is a family firm as identified by Business Week (2003), and zero otherwise; other 
independent variables include firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉), firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵), return on 
assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴), loss dummy⁡(𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆), and the interaction terms between 𝑁𝐼  and all of these separate variables including 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚. Please refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. Regressions include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 14-2: Regression Analysis on the Comparison in Earnings Informativeness between Family and Non-family 
Firms—Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Absolute Idiosyncratic Volatility as Control Variables 
 
RET RET RET RET RET RET RET RET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NI 0.6616*** 3.1600 NI 0.6227*** 1.7357 NI 0.3717* -0.3770 NI 0.3735** -0.7858
(3.64) (1.45) (3.44) (0.90) (1.95) (-0.18) (1.97) (-0.40)
NI×FamFirm 0.9497*** 1.0546*** NI×FamFirm 0.9732*** 1.0701*** NI×FamFirm 0.9358*** 0.9819*** NI×FamFirm 0.9375*** 1.0010***
(3.34) (3.44) (3.46) (3.53) (3.15) (2.96) (3.17) (3.03)
NI×IdioVol_A4 0.6936*** NI×IdioVol_A5 0.5848** NI×IdioVol_A6 0.1609 NI×IdioVol_A7 0.1094
(2.58) (2.33) (0.83) (0.62)
NI×SIZE 0.3331 NI×SIZE 0.3136 NI×SIZE 0.2945 NI×SIZE 0.2773
(1.64) (1.57) (1.41) (0.35)
NI×LEV -1.3625 NI×LEV -1.3688 NI×LEV -1.0852 NI×LEV -1.0431
(-1.32) (-1.34) (-0.98) (-0.95)
NI×MB 0.0888 NI×MB 0.1049 NI×MB -0.1774 NI×MB -0.1558
(0.32) (0.39) (-0.61) (-0.54)
NI×AGE 0.2870 NI×AGE 0.2120 NI×AGE 0.0956 NI×AGE 0.0663
(1.07) (0.83) (0.34) (0.24)
NI×LOSS -0.9367** NI×LOSS -0.8844** NI×LOSS -0.6457 NI×LOSS -0.6131
(-2.13) (-2.040 (-1.41) (-1.34)
NI×ROA -1.6924 NI×ROA -1.5440 NI×ROA -1.4842 NI×ROA -1.4376
(-0.91) (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.75)
FamFirm 0.0355 0.0329 FamFirm 0.0332 0.0312 FamFirm 0.0032 0.0016 FamFirm 0.0022 0.0006
(1.64) (1.51) (1.54) (1.44) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02)
IdioVol_A4Fit -0.1457*** -0.1618*** IdioVol_A5Fit -0.1133*** -0.1269*** IdioVol_A6Fit 0.0795** 0.0791** IdioVol_A7Fit 0.0732** 0.0728**
(-4.12) (-4.47) (-2.83) (-3.10) (2.53) (2.48) (2.37) (2.31)
SIZE -0.0229* -0.0265** SIZE -0.0166 -0.0199 SIZE 0.0378** 0.0360** SIZE 0.0337** 0.0319*
(-1.92) (-2.20) (-1.37) (-1.63) (2.13) (2.01) (1.97) (1.84)
LEV -0.1521 -0.1440 LEV -0.1477 -0.1368 LEV -0.0321 -0.0164 LEV -0.0318 -0.0162
(-1.59) (-1.50) (-1.55) (-1.43) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.31) (-0.15)
MB 0.1105*** 0.1115*** MB 0.1074*** 0.1088*** MB 0.0824*** 0.0847*** MB 0.0833*** 0.0859***
(5.32) (5.33) (5.17) (5.22) (3.81) (3.88) (3.88) (3.96)
AGE -0.0001 -0.0044 AGE 0.0054 0.0016 AGE 0.0457** 0.0450** AGE 0.0456** 0.0449**
(-0.00) (-0.26) (0.32) (0.09) (2.52) (2.44) (2.49) (2.42)
LOSS -0.1104** -0.1198** LOSS -0.1168** -0.1230*** LOSS -0.1454*** -0.1456*** LOSS -0.1447*** -0.1441***
(-2.41) (-2.56) (-2.58) (-2.67) (-3.04) (-3.00) (-3.04) (-2.99)
ROA -0.6566*** -0.6493** ROA -0.6261** -0.6263** ROA -0.3377 -0.3130 ROA -0.3419 -0.3226
(-2.60) (-2.52) (-2.49) (-2.45) (-1.26) (-1.14) (-1.28) (-1.18)
Intercept -0.9981*** -1.0931*** Intercept -0.6220*** -0.6810*** Intercept 0.2946* 0.3006* Intercept 0.1669 0.1739
(-3.93) (-4.21) (-2.72) (-2.91) (1.72) (1.72) (1.20) (1.23)
N 898 898 N 898 898 N 898 898 N 898 898
Ajusted R
2
0.1853 0.1907 Ajusted R
2
0.1824 0.1867 Ajusted R
2
0.1628 0.1613 Ajusted R
2
0.1641 0.1626
Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes Industry Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No Year Effects No No
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Appendix A: Definition of Control Variables for Regression Analysis on the Comparison in 
Idiosyncratic Volatility between Family and Non-family Firms 
ROE
VROE
LEV Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to total assets (AT).
M/B
SIZE
DD
AGE
DIVER
Compustat & Author's 
computation
Market-to-book Compustat & Author's 
computation
Market capitalization Compustat & Author's 
computation
Market-to-book is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total market value 
of equity (MKVALT) to total common/ordinary equity (CEQ).
Market capitalization is defined as the natural logarithm of total market value of equity 
(MKVALT).
Volatility of return-
on-equity
Leverage Compustat & Author's 
computation
Defined as sample variance of quarterly ROEs over the last 12 quarters (i.e. over the 
last 3 years). 
Compustat & Author's 
computation
Variable Definition Source
Return-on-equity Return-on-equity is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items (IB) to 
total common/ordinary equity (CEQ). 
Compustat & Author's 
computation
 (Note: the combination of capital letters in each pair of parentheses represents 
Compustat code for its corresponding variable)
Compustat
CRSP
Firm age CRSP & Author's computation
Dividend dummy Dividend dummy is defined as being equal to one if a firm pays dividends (such firms 
with distribution code "1232" are identified through CRSP, where "1232" represents 
"US cash dividend, quarterly, taxable same rate as dividends".), and zero otherwise.
Firm age is measured as the natural logarithm of years, where years are computed by 
dividing the number of months, since a stock was incorporated into CRSP, by 12. 
The begin of stock data are obtained from CRSP Stock Header Information. 
Earnings smoothing 
(ES1  and ES2 )
ES1 and ES2 (1) Earnings smoothing (ES1 ) is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
operating income (OIADP) to the standard deviation of operating cash flow, in which 
both the numerator and the denominator are scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
Operating cash flow is defined as operating income (OIADP) minus accruals, where 
accruals are defined as:                                                                        
ACCRUALS i,t  = (∆CA i,t  - ∆CASH i,t ) - (∆CL i,t  - ∆STD i,t - ∆TP i,t ) - DEP i,t ,  
in which CA i,t  is total current assets (ACT), CASH i,t  is cash or cash equivalents 
(CHE), CL i,t  is total current liabilities (LCT), STD i,t  is short-term debt (DLC), 
TP i,t  is income tax payable (TXP), and DEP i,t  is depreciation expense (DP); "i " 
denotes companies and "t " indexes years. A lower  value of ES1  would indicate a 
higher  level of earnings smoothing.                                                                       
(2) For convenience of expression, we construct an alternative measure (ES2 ) of 
earnings smoothing, where ES2  = 1 - ES1 . A higher  value of ES2  would indicate 
a higher  level of earnings smoothing.                                     
Diversification 
dummy
Diversification dummy is defined as being equal to one if a firm has more than one 
two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B: Definition of Control Variables for Regression Analysis on the Comparison in 
Corporate Risk-taking between Family and Non-family Firms 
 
  
LogInitialFirmSize
InitialBookLeverage
InitialSalesGrowthInitial sales growth Compustat & Author's 
computation
Initial sales growth is defined as the average annual sales growth over our sample 
period (2003—2007), where annual sales growth at t is defined as (S t / S t-1 ) - 1 , 
in which "S"  represents sales and "t"  indexes years.   
Earnings smoothing 
(ES1  and ES2 )
Compustat & Author's 
computation
ES1  and ES2 (1) Earnings smoothing (ES1 ) is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
operating income (OIADP) to the standard deviation of operating cash flow, in 
which both the numerator and the denominator are scaled by lagged total assets 
(AT). Operating cash flow is defined as operating income (OIADP) minus accruals, 
where accruals are defined as:                                                             
ACCRUALS i,t  = (∆CA i,t  - ∆CASH i,t ) - (∆CL i,t  - ∆STD i,t  - ∆TP i,t ) - DEP i,t ,  
in which CA i,t  is total current assets (ACT), CASH i,t  is cash or cash equivalents 
(CHE), CL i,t  is total current liabilities (LCT), STD i,t  is short-term debt (DLC), 
TP i,t  is income tax payable (TXP), and DEP i,t  is depreciation expense (DP); "i" 
denotes companies and "t"  indexes years. A lower  value of ES1 would indicate a 
higher  level of earnings smoothing.                                                                      
(2) For convenience of expression, we construct an alternative measure (ES2 ) of 
earnings smoothing, where ES2 = 1 - ES1 . A higher  value of ES2  would indicate 
a higher  level of earnings smoothing.                                                                         
Initial book leverage Initial book leverage is defined as the ratio of book debt to total assets (AT), where 
book debt is defined as total liabilities (LT) plus preferred stock (PSTK) minus 
deferred taxes (TXDB). All the variables are retrieved as of 2003 which is the 
beginning year of our sample period (2003—2007).
Compustat & Author's 
computation
Initial corporate 
earnings
Initial corporate earnings are defined as the ratio of EBITDA (OIBDP) to total 
assets (AT). Both of the two variables are retrieved as of 2003 which is the 
beginning year of our sample period (2003—2007).
Compustat & Author's 
computation
InitialCorporateEarnings
Variable Definition Source
 (Note: the combination of capital letters in each pair of parentheses represents 
Compustat code for its corresponding variable)
Initial firm size Initial firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (AT), where total 
assets (AT) are retrieved as of 2003 which is the beginning year of our sample 
period (2003—2007).
Compustat & Author's 
computation
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Appendix C: Definition of Control Variables for Regression Analysis on the Comparison in 
Earnings Informativeness between Family and Non-family Firms 
 
 
NI
SIZE
LEV
MB
AGE
LOSS
ROAReturn-on-assets Return-on-assets is defined as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by total assets (AT). 
Compustat & Author's 
computation
Variable Definition Source
 (Note: the combination of capital letters in each pair of parentheses 
represents Compustat code for its corresponding variable)
Compustat & Author's 
computation
Scaled change-in-
net-income
Scaled change-in-net-income is defined as the difference between net 
income (NI) for year t and net income for year t-1, divided by the total 
market value of equity (MKVALT) at the end of year t-1. 
Firm size Compustat & Author's 
computation
Firm leverage Compustat & Author's 
computation
Firm leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to total 
assets (AT).
Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total market value of 
equity (MKVALT).
Loss dummy Loss dummy is defined as being equal to one if a firm's net income (NI) 
is less than zero, and zero otherwise.
Compustat
Market-to-book Compustat & Author's 
computation
Firm age CRSP & Author's computationFirm age is measured as the natural logarithm of years, where years are 
computed by dividing the number of months, since a stock was 
incorporated into CRSP, by 12. The begin of stock data are obtained 
from CRSP Stock Header Information. 
Market-to-book is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total 
market value of equity (MKVALT) to total common/ordinary equity 
